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ETHICS COMMITTEES AND DUE PROCESS:
NESTING RIGHTS IN A COMMUNITY OF CARING
SUSAN M. WOLF*
In 1976 the New Jersey Supreme Court decided the case of
Karen Ann Quinlan.' Fifteen years later, it is hard to remember
what a momentous decision that was, the first from an appellate
court on the right of a patient to refuse life-sustaining treatment, the
so-called "right to die." The Quinlan court was clearly impressed by
the gravity of the ethical and legal problems involved. Thanks to
advances in medical technology, patients, families, caregivers, and
courts now faced difficult life and death decisions, and with growing
frequency. Yet there was no common agreement on how the deci-
sionmaking process should proceed.
Searching for guidance on how to shape that process, the court
turned to an unlikely source. The court uncovered a short and ob-
scure article written by a pediatrician in the Baylor Law Review.'
Quoting the author at length, the judges seized upon her sugges-
tion: "an Ethics Committee . . .to review the individual circum-
stances of ethical dilemma[s] and .. .provide[] ... assistance and
safeguards for patients and their medical caretakers."' Thus was
born what many now call the "ethics committee movement."
Ethics committees pre-dated Quinlan, but it was this decision
that gave them their first prominence. By the time the President's
Commission on biomedical ethics issued its seminal report on for-
going life-sustaining treatment seven years later,4 ethics committees
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1. See In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
2. Teel, The Physician's Dilemma: A Doctor's View: What the Law Should Be, 27 BAYLOR
L. REV. 6 (1975).
3. 70 NJ. at 49, 355 A.2d at 668 (quoting Teel, supra note 2, at 8-9).
4. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-
SUSTAINING TREATMENT]. I follow the common practice and refer to the commission as
the "President's Commission."
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had proliferated somewhat, but as yet a tiny fraction of hospitals5
had them. The Commission reported that only one percent of hos-
pitals possessed such a committee.6 Even restricting the analysis to
larger institutions, those over two hundred beds, the number was
still less than five percent.7
Today all of that has changed. Ethics committees have spread
substantially,' to the point that well over half of American hospitals
have such a committee.9 An extensive literature on these commit-
tees has arisen, complete with articles, books, and guidelines.' °
5. Most ethics committees exist within hospitals rather than nursing homes or other
types of health care institutions. See Zweibel & Cassel, Ethics Committees in Nursing Homes:
Applying the Hospital Experience, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug.-Sept. 1988, at 23. Conse-
quently, this article focuses on ethics committees within hospitals. However, the argu-
ments I make in this article would also apply to ethics committees in other health care
institutions such as nursing homes, perhaps with even greater force. In comparing hos-
pital patients and nursing home residents, Zweibel and Cassel suggest that there is a
"need for greater efforts to protect the rights of... residents." Id. at 24.
6. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT,
supra note 4, at 446.
7. Id.
8. See Hoffmann, Regulating Ethics Committees in Health Care Institutions-Is It Time?, 50
MD. L. REV. 746, 746 (1991) (reciting data on the spread of ethics committees); see also
Cohen, Birth of a Network, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb.-Mar. 1988, at 11 ("In 1982, only
one percent of American hospitals had established these committees; today, over 60
percent of hospitals with 200 beds or more have them.").
9. See Hoffmann, supra note 8, at 746; Cohen, supra note 8, at 11.
10. I could not possibly cite all that has emerged. However, some of the most prom-
inent and influential discussions of ethics committees have occurred in the following
sources, cited roughly in the order in which they appeared: Levine, Hospital Ethics Com-
mittees: A Guarded Prognosis, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1977, at 25; Veatch, Hospital
Ethics Committees: Is There a Role?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1977, at 22; Cohen, Inter-
disciplinary Consultation on the Care of the Critically Ill and Dying: The Role of One Hospital Ethics
Committee, 10 CRITICAL CARE MED. 776 (1982); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, DECIDING To
FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 4; INsTrrUTIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEES
AND HEALTH CARE DECISION MAKING (R. Cranford & A. Doudera eds. 1984) [hereinafter
INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEES]; Robertson, Ethics Committees in Hospitals: Alternative
Structures and Responsibilities, 10 Quality Rev. Bull. 6 (Jan. 1984); Youngner, Coulton,
Juknialis & Jackson, Patients' Attitudes Toward Hospital Ethics Committees, 12 LAW, MED. &
HEALTH CARE 21 (1984); Levine, Questions and (Some Very Tentative) Answers about Hospital
Ethics Committees, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1984, at 9; Cranford, Hester & Ashley,
Institutional Ethics Committees: Issues of Confidentiality and Immunity, 13 LAw, MED. & HEALTH
CARE 52 (1985); Capron, Legal Perspectives on Institutional Ethics Committees, 11 J. C.U.L.
417 (1985); Fost & Cranford, Hospital Ethics Committees: Administrative Aspects, 253 J.
A.M.A. 2687 (1985); Rosner, Hospital Medical Ethics Committees: A Review of Their Develop-
ment, 253 J. A.M.A. 2693 (1985); J. Ross, C. BAYLEY, V. MICHEL & D. PUGH, HANDBOOK
FOR HOSPITAL ETHICS COMMiTrEES (1986) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]; Siegler, Ethics Com-
mittees: Decisions by Bureaucracy, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1986, at 22; Lo, Behind Closed
Doors: Promises and Pitfalls of Ethics Committees, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 46 (1987); Merritt,
The Tort Liability of Hospital Ethics Committees, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239 (1987); R. MACKLIN
& R. KUPFER, HOSPITAL ETHICS COMMITEES: MANUAL FOR A TRAINING PROGRAM (Albert
Einstein College of Medicine, Mar. 1988). In addition, professional societies have is-
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There are even journals specializing in the problems of ethics
committees. "
A number of legislatures and courts have embraced ethics com-
mittees as well. The State of Maryland requires ethics committees
by statute.' 2 The federal "Baby Doe" regulatory scheme encour-
ages them in order to review treatment decisions for infants.' 3
Other legislative proposals have contemplated or mandated their
use.' 4 Various judicial decisions have also encouraged resort to eth-
ics committees.' 5 Indeed, some courts have taken cognizance of
sued guidelines on ethics committees. See Judicial Council, American Medical Associa-
tion, Guidelines for Ethics Committees in Health Care Institutions, 253 J. A.M.A. 2698 (1985)
[hereinafter AMA Guidelines]; AMERICAN NURSES' ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON ETHICS,
GUIDELINES FOR NURSES' PARTICIPATION AND LEADERSHIP IN INSTITUTIONAL ETHICAL RE-
VIEW PROCESSES (American Nurses' Association 1985); AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIA-
TION, GUIDELINES: HOSPITAL COMMITrEES ON BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (1984) [hereinafter
AHA Guidelines]. In preparing the above list, and generally in doing research for this
article, I was greatly aided by two resources developed at The Hastings Center. One is a
packet of materials entitled "Ethics Committees: Core Resources," which includes a
number of articles and the Handbook listed above. The second is a bibliography also
included in those materials. See Swenson, Gauri, Posner & Nolan, A Selected, Annotated
Bibliography of Ethics Committees (Hastings Center 1988). The Hastings Center Report
now publishes a regular section devoted to ethics committees, edited by Cynthia Cohen
with Thomasine Kushner. See, e.g., Ethics Committees, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct.
1990, at 33.
11. See, e.g., Hosp. ETHICS COMMITTEE Q.; J. CLINICAL ETHICS.
12. See MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 19-370 to -374 (1990 & Supp. 1990).
13. See HHS Model Guidelines for Health Care Providers to Establish Infant Care
Review Committees, originally published at 50 Fed. Reg. 14,893 (1985), as authorized
by amendments to the federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C.
33 5101-17 (1988) [hereinafter HHS Model Guidelines]. This article, however, focuses
on general ethics committees rather than the more specialized infant care review com-
mittees (ICRCs), which have been created in some institutions in order to advise on
treatment decisions for newborn and infant patients pursuant to the federal "Baby Doe"
statutory and regulatory scheme. Though there are some comparative references to in-
fant care review committees infra, the ground rules and procedures for those committees
raise somewhat different process issues because the elaborate federal "Baby Doe"
scheme recommends specific procedures and standards for the committees.
14. The proposed Senate version of the now-enacted Patient Self-Determination Act
would have mandated the creation of ethics committees in health care institutions re-
ceiving Medicare or Medicaid funding. See S. 1766, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG.
REC. 13,566-74 (Oct. 17, 1989), passed as amended in Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4206 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1819, 1833, 1877
and 1891). The Maryland State Bar Association has proposed that the state adopt legis-
lation permitting ethics committee determinations to substitute for judicial review in
some cases. See Hoffmann, supra note 8, at 750.
15. That encouragement began with the Quinlan requirement that the parties in that
case gain the approval of an ethics committee before discontinuing mechanical ventila-
tion of the patient. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 54, 355 A.2d 647, 671, cert. denied, 429
U.S. 922 (1976). Since then, other courts have commented on the utility of ethics com-
mittee consultation, with more or less approval. See Severns v. Wilmington Medical
Center, 421 A.2d 1334, 1341-44 (Del. 1980); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 635, 405
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prior ethics committee determinations in deciding cases about the
termination of life-sustaining treatment.' 6
As ethics committees have become increasingly common, and
indeed sometimes a mandated feature of the hospital landscape,
they have become increasingly powerful. Over time, many individ-
ual committees have gained in stature and acceptance, wielding
greater and greater influence.' 7 In some spheres of ethics commit-
tee activity this is not a problem. Typically, an ethics committee is a
multidisciplinary group, including but not limited to health care
professionals, that is convened within the institution to address ethi-
cal issues in patient care.' Committees do this in several ways-by
leading educational programs, drafting institutional policy on issues
such as the use of "do not resuscitate" orders, and analyzing ethical
problems in past medical cases. However, by far the most problem-
atic activity in which committees engage is to address ethical issues
in ongoing cases involving current patients. Performing this func-
tion means that a committee is consulted in active treatment dis-
putes. When the physician and the patient or the patient's family' 9
disagree, the physician (or far more rarely, the patient or family)
may well take the case to the ethics committee.
N.E.2d 115, 120 (1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373
Mass. 728, 758-59, 370 N.E.2d 417, 434 (1977); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 338-39
(Minn. 1984).
16. See Spring, 380 Mass. at 635, 405 N.E.2d at 120; Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 758-59,
370 N.E.2d at 434; Torres, 357 N.W.2d at 338-39; see also Wolf, Ethics Committees in the
Courts, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1986, at 12.
17. See Ritchie, When It's Not Really Optional, HASTINGS CENTER REP. Aug.-Sept. 1988,
at 25 ("Initially, ethics committees tended to be informal groups .... Today's ethics
committees are more likely ... to have official status within the institution .... [T]hey
often command greater notice and their recommendations may be seen as more
binding.").
18. Cf. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, LIFE-SUSTAINING TECH-
NOLOGIES AND THE ELDERLY 444 (1987) (defining an ethics committee as a
"[clonsultative committee in a hospital or other institution whose role is to analyze ethi-
cal dilemmas and to advise and educate health care providers, patients, and families
regarding difficult treatment decisions"); Cranford & Doudera, The Emergence of Institu-
tional Ethics Committees, in INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEES, supra note 10, at 5 (defin-
ing an ethics committee as "a multidisciplinary group of health care professionals within
a health care institution that has been specifically established to address the ethical di-
lemmas that occur within the institution"). In this article, I have deliberately not defined
ethics committees as advisory bodies because I argue that one of the most important
questions to be asked about these committees is whether they are indeed purely advisory
or in fact wield greater power.
19. Throughout this article, I use the term "family" broadly to refer not just to the
patient's kin by birth, upbringing, or marriage, but to those who are the patient's inti-
mates. An appointed surrogate decisionmaker for the patient, who may be in none of
these categories, may also become involved in a dispute over the patient's care.
1991]
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Many have lauded committees for their capacity to perform this
function, advising on current cases and resolving disputes. The
Maryland statute, the federal "Baby Doe" guidelines, the court
cases taking note of these committees, and the great bulk of the
scholarship and commentary on ethics committees all give their en-
dorsement. Accordingly, great numbers of ethics committees are
busily performing concurrent case review.2 0
They do so wielding substantial and growing influence. What
the ethics committee advises can carry decisive weight. Moreover,
many disputes will never make it into court; the committee will serve
as the forum of last resort. Even when a case does make it to court,
the committee's prior determination may exert substantial influ-
ence. As noted above, some judges have considered the prior com-
mittee determination, and have even suggested that courts should
accord such a determination some deference.2 '
All of this comes at a time when the courts are attempting to
sort out the basic legal rights involved, most notably in the Cruzan
case decided by the Supreme Court last year.22 In that case most of
the Justices suggested that at least a competent patient's treatment
decision would enjoy constitutional protection.2 ' Thus, in con-
ducting concurrent case review, ethics committees may often be
dealing with constitutionally protected rights.
Given the fact that ethics committees have proliferated substan-
20. The terms "concurrent case review" or "prospective case review" are often used
to distinguish review of an ongoing case from the retrospective review of a completed
case undertaken for the purposes of ethics committee self-education. See, e.g., HAND-
BOOK, supra note 10, at 58; Bayley & Cranford, Ethics Committees: What We Have Learned, in
MAKING CHOICES: ETHICS ISSUES FOR HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS 193, 195 (E. Fried-
man ed. 1986).
21. See Wolf, Ethics Committees in the Courts, supra note 16.
22. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
23. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Cruzan, conceded that a competent
patient refusing unwanted treatment asserts a constitutionally protected liberty interest.
See id. at 2851. However, Justice Scalia's concurrence indicated that he did not join in
this view. See id. at 2859 (Scalia, J., concurring). Nonetheless, the four dissenting Jus-
tices clearly did agree that a competent patient's treatment refusal enjoys constitutional
protection. See id. at 2863 (Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting); id. at 2878
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Indeed, they would have gone further, to find the treatment
refusal by Nancy Cruzan's parents on their incompetent daughter's behalf constitution-
ally protected as well. Thus, a majority of the Court has indicated that at least compe-
tent patients refusing treatment are asserting a constitutionally protected right. In
addition, Justice O'Connor in her concurrence suggested that when a patient has ap-
pointed a proxy decisionmaker, through a mechanism such as a durable power of attor-
ney, treatment refusals by that proxy might enjoy constitutional protection as well. See
id. at 2856 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The logic of the dissents indicates that the four
dissenters would join her in this.
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tially, have been embraced by statute, regulation, and the courts,
and are capable of wielding substantial power in a domain of pro-
tected rights, one might expect to see these committees according at
least the rudiments of due process. That expectation, however,
would be sorely disappointed. Most of these committees accord
nothing resembling due process. All indications are that most fail
even to give the patient notice and an opportunity to be heard, 4
much less other tools a patient might need to participate effectively
in the ethics committee's proceedings.2 5 The Maryland statute of-
24. See, e.g., Hoffmann, supra note 8, at 765 n. 109; Hoffmann, Does Legislating Hospital
Ethics Committees Make a Diference?: A Study of Hospital Ethics Committees in Maryland, the
District of Columbia, and Virginia 38 (1991) (to be published in forthcoming issue of LAW,
MED. & HEALTH CARE) (unpublished manuscript on file at the Maryland Law Review);
Youngner, Coulton, Juknialis & Jackson, supra note 10, at 24; Youngner, Jackson,
Coulton, Juknialis & Smith, A National Survey of Hospital Ethics Committees, 11 CRITICAL
CARE MED. 902, 904 (1983) (hereinafter A National Survey]; infra note 105 and accompa-
nying text.
25. Throughout this article I refer to patients' rights and the need to provide proce-
dural protections to patients. However, when a patient lacks decisional capacity, a fam-
ily member or other surrogate typically exercises the patient's rights on her behalf. See
generally A. BUCHANAN & D. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE ETHICS OF SURROGATE
DECISION MAKING (1989). The fact that a surrogate is exercising the patient's rights in
no way diminishes the necessity for due process. The arguments I offer in the text for
according procedural protections would apply as well to the surrogate voicing the pa-
tient's preferences or otherwise attempting to safeguard the patient's best interests.
Thus my claims concerning patients throughout this article apply both to patients with
decisional capacity, and patients without capacity who instead have a family member or
other surrogate speaking for them. I and others have made clear in past work the neces-
sity of a surrogate for all patients who lack capacity. See, e.g., THE HASTINGS CENTER,
GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF THE
DYING 24-26 [hereinafter GUIDELINES]. For a powerful argument in favor of broad deci-
sional authority on the part of the patient's family, see Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death,
102 HARV. L. REV. 375 (1988).
In some treatment disputes, of course, the disagreement is over whether the family
or other purported surrogate is actually the appropriate representative for the patient.
One might argue that in such cases the patient's right to participate in committee pro-
ceedings cannot be the basis for the purported surrogate's participation, because the
precise question is whether the latter should be permitted to exercise the rights of the
former. However, Rhoden suggests that the burden should rest on the medical
caregivers to overcome a presumption in favor of family decisionmaking. This suggests
that until the family is unseated as surrogate, they do indeed exercise the patient's
rights. Indeed, in many circumstances that "unseating" will not be within the powers of
an ethics committee or a medical institution, but will require going to court for a formal
adjudication of who the patient's surrogate should be.
In any case, even when the dispute before an ethics committee focuses on the au-
thority of purported surrogates, it is difficult to see how the committee could fully un-
derstand the dispute and properly protect the patient's rights and interests without the
participation of the would-be surrogates.
Finally, even when a family's authority to speak for a patient is in doubt, there may
often be no one on the scene who is better able to reconstruct the patient's treatment
preferences and ascertain what treatment course is in her interests. Though someone
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fers some procedural protection, but hardly enough.2 6 The federal
"Baby Doe" committee guidelines offer even less.27
Even more remarkably, there is no hue and cry. Instead, there
is a widespread sense that ethics committees are fine as they are,
without the cumbersome requirements of due process.2 8 This arti-
cle explores why this is so-the roots of that complacency. It is ulti-
mately an argument for restructuring the ethics committee process
by embracing a broad concept of due process, one grounded not
only in law but also in ethics and what I call below the "transforma-
tive obligations" of ethics committees.
Part I begins by taking a long step back from the details of pro-
cess to ask first what beliefs about ethics committees have allowed
them to escape the requirements of due process. I identify an ac-
cepted gospel, a mythology about ethics committees. According to
this set of beliefs, ethics committees are in their infancy and so
should be free to experiment as they see fit in designing their proce-
dures. The second belief is that these committees are purely advi-
sory and wield no decisionmaking power of their own. The third is
that ethics committees promote the interests of patients anyway,
without any need for due process. Part I rejects all three claims and
debunks the mythology by showing that ethics committees are in-
creasingly widespread and entrenched, sometimes wield determina-
tive power in treatment disputes, and can greatly disadvantage
patients.
Having rejected the usual description of ethics committees, Part
II then explores the question of how to describe them properly, in
order to ground the formulation of a suitable ethics committee pro-
cess. This section examines the literature on committee process and
finds a dichotomy in scholars' writings about ethics committees.
Committees are often depicted as support mechanisms for physi-
cians and other hospital caregivers. Ethics committee consultation
is thus likened to the consultation of medical committees or expert
else may ultimately take over the role of surrogate, the family's information and assess-
ments will remain highly relevant. This, too, argues for their participation in ethics com-
mittee proceedings.
26. See MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 19-370 to -374 (1990 & Supp. 1990), dis-
cussed infra in text accompanying notes 158-169.
27. See HHS Model Guidelines, supra note 13.
28. There certainly are exceptions to this. For example, see Hoffmann, supra note 8,
at 785-90 (arguing that if ethics committees become mandated by legislation, they
should be held to certain standards). Other commentators who have advocated that
ethics committees be held to some kind of standards include S. ELIAS & G. ANNAS, RE-
PRODUCTIVE GENETICS AND THE LAW, ch. 7 (1987), and Veatch, Advice and Consent, HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 20, 20-22.
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medical colleagues. This view yields a model of process that is in-
formal, focuses most immediately on the needs of caregivers, and
offers no procedural protections to the patient. I label this model
the Consultation Model. On the other hand, some scholars liken
ethics committees to courts. In this view, ethics committee process
must be more formal, the focus is on patients' rights, and the com-
mittee must afford procedural protections. I label this model the
Adjudicatory Model. Part II argues that, in fact, the dichotomy be-
tween the caregiver-focused Consultation Model and the patient-fo-
cused Adjudicatory Model is too sharp. Ethics committees have
drawn on both models. Indeed, committees can flip back and forth.
The result is that the committees end up being rather like one of
those baffling prints by M.C. Escher, that one minute seems to show
a flock of birds in flight, and the next minute a school of fish swim-
ming in the opposite direction. 9 There is a shifting duality-one
minute fish and the next minute fowl-and a consequent elusiveness
to the identity of ethics committees. That poses real dangers, espe-
cially for patients and their families, who may not be included at all
in the committees's process. This dangerous double identity re-
flects the fact that we are still in the midst of a struggle between
traditional physician paternalism and a newer effort to recognize pa-
tients' rights. The proliferation of ethics committees has been part
of an attempt to revolutionize medical relationships by shifting deci-
sional power to the patient, but it is a revolution that so far is incom-
plete and swamped in ambivalence. The double-identity is also
rooted in the related ambivalence of our language, the dual dis-
course that we speak about clinical decisionmaking. On the one
hand we speak the language of rights and self-determination, in
both ethics and law. On the other hand, we speak the language of
protective community and caring. It is thus no accident that in talk-
ing about ethics committees we are trapped in ambivalence and
double-speak.
Then, what to do? Part III of the article pursues reconstruc-
tion. It argues that the first step in constructing a sound process is
to recognize that committees' foremost obligation is to serve and
protect the patient. This mandates due process. I argue for due
process not only in fulfillment of the committee's legal obligations,
but also its ethical and transformative ones. Part III then suggests a
process. The challenge is to find procedures that will protect not
29. See D. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, VISIONS OF SYMMETRY: NOTEBOOKS, PERIODIC DRAw-
INGS, AND RELATED WORK OF M.C. ESCHER 215 (1990).
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only the patient's rights and self-determination, but also her rela-
tionships to medical personnel and continued connection to profes-
sional and medical caregiving. To accomplish this, Part III suggests
that ethics committees afford due process in their own case consul-
tations. More than that, they should become the leading propo-
nents of due process in the clinical setting, instigating a process of
innovation and change within that culture. The idea is to domesti-
cate due process, to make it not the lawyerly enemy of the physician,
but the tool to guarantee that the patient is heard. In this way due
process becomes the protector not only of rights, but of relation-
ships. The goal is not to alienate the caregivers from their patient,
but to cement them to her through a process that allows for conflict
and rights. By embracing due process, ethics committees can be-
come true advocates for patients' rights, rights that are nested in a
community of caregiving.
I. DEBUNKING THE REIGNING MYTHOLOGY
There is an accepted gospel on ethics committees that rational-
izes the absence of due process in committee deliberations. The
standard set of beliefs provides that ethics committees are still in
their infancy and thus should be permitted to experiment with dif-
ferent forms and processes rather than be held to any definite set of
expectations. In any case, it is further argued, these committees are
purely advisory with no decisionmaking power of their own. The
attending physician remains fully responsible for the patient, and
the courthouse door remains wide open. Consequently, individual
ethics committees may do whatever they think best, since whatever
the committee does takes nothing away from the physician's ac-
countability or the court's availability. Finally, for those who might
still harbor doubts, the ultimate reassurance has been that ethics
committees promote ethical decisionmaking and thus are good for
patients.
In this section I reject all three basic tenets of the reigning my-
thology on ethics committees. However, one important caveat is in
order. Certainly there are some ethics committees that are still in
their infancy, some that are purely advisory and whose advice may
indeed be rejected, and some that are good for patients. This sec-
tion nonetheless rejects these propositions as accurate generaliza-
tions about ethics committees, and as a reliable basis on which to
absolve committees of the responsibility to accord due process.
806 [VOL. 50:798
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A. The Myth of Infancy
For an awfully long time now, people have been saying that eth-
ics committees are in their infancy and should be free to experi-
ment. At some point, though, infancy gives way to adolescence, and
some sort of expectations are in order."0 We have reached that
point with ethics committees. They have proliferated enormously,
and now are a common feature of hospitals.
That ethics committees are no longer some kind of novel exper-
iment is borne out by the fact that today ethics committees are man-
dated or recognized by statutory schemes, legislative proposals, and
court decisions. In addition to the Maryland statute and the federal
"Baby Doe" framework already mentioned,3 ' a Hawaii statute rec-
ognizes ethics committees, confers immunity on committee mem-
bers, and provides that one ethics committee function is to "make
decisions regarding ethical questions, including decisions on life-
sustaining therapy."3 2 New York State's legislation governing "do
not resuscitate" orders, while not mandating ethics committees,
does require that institutions maintain a "dispute mediation mecha-
nism,"533 a requirement that might well be fulfilled by using an ethics
committee. The proposed Senate version of the "Patient Self-De-
termination Act" that was recently enacted by Congress would have
required Medicare and Medicaid providers to establish ethics com-
mittees.3 4 A Maryland State Bar Association proposal suggests al-
lowing ethics committee deliberations to substitute for judicial
review in some cases.35 In addition to all of these statutory propos-
als and schemes, various courts beginning with Quinlan have sug-
gested or required the use of ethics committees. 3 6
At what point is it appropriate to levy expectations on ethics
committees? It is when they become entrenched, and begin to wield
influence. Before that time, the committee is a curiosity, something
30. For another author who has become impatient with the language of "infancy"
and has traded it for the language of "adolescence," see Cohen, The Adolescence of Ethics
Committees, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 29. But see Merritt, Assessing the
Risk of Legal Liability for Ethics Committees, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb.-Mar. 1988, at 13,
14 ("[e]thics committees are still in their infancy"); Merritt, supra note 10, at 1241
(same).
31. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
32. HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.7 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
33. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2972 (McKinney Supp. 1991).
34. See S. 1766, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. 13,566-74 (1989); see also
Hoffmann, supra note 8, at 749 nn. 12-14.
35. See Hoffmann, supra note 8, at 750.
36. See cases cited supra note 15; Wolf, Ethics Committees in the Courts, supra note 16.
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new to try, and the committee is readily challenged and criticized. It
is genuinely in the process of being shaped, assessed, and reshaped,
as a prelude to settling down and becoming institutionalized.
By now, many and perhaps most committees are no longer in
that preliminary phase, but instead have settled into routines. They
are institutionalized and entrenched. Indeed, some are mandated
by the law. No one will readily uproot them. They are here to
stay.3
7
At this point, the sheer difficulty of challenging ethics commit-
tee processes imposes upon the committee a responsibility to assure
that those processes meet at least some minimum standard. The
committee can no longer do as it pleases; it has institutional func-
tions to perform. If those functions involve review of ongoing cases
and dispute resolution, then the committee must take steps to en-
sure that its procedures are suitable and protect the vulnerable par-
ties. The claim of infancy thus cannot be used to absolve
committees of procedural obligations.
B. The Myth that Committees are Purely Advisory
It is amazing how long the claim has persisted that ethics com-
mittees are purely advisory, given that the President's Commission
reported data to the contrary eight years ago. The Commission's
survey of ethics committees revealed that over thirty percent classi-
fied making treatment decisions as one of the committee's actual
functions, in contrast to merely providing counsel, support, and re-
view.3 8 Yet commentators are only now beginning to recognize that
ethics committees are not purely advisory."9
It is difficult to generalize about the amount of influence that
ethics committees actually wield. With apologies to Gertrude Stein,
an ethics committee is not an ethics committee is not an ethics com-
mittee. They vary substantially.4" Some are merely shadow com-
37. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
38. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT,
supra note 4, at 164, 451.
39. See Merritt, supra note 10, at 1248-49, 1271-75; Ritchie, supra note 17, at 25 (rec-
ognizing that ethics committee recommendations exert varying degrees of influence,
ranging "from truly optional to nearly mandatory"); Moreno, Institutional Ethics Commit-
tees: Proceed with Caution, 50 MD. L. REV. 895-99 (1991). Merritt actually argues "It is
possible that in some.., cases, final decisionmaking authority should. .. rest with the
committee." Merritt, supra note 10, at 1249 (emphasis added). One commentator who
did focus relatively early on the Commission's data and the potential for committees to
become actual decisionmakers is Mark Siegler. See Siegler, supra note 10, at 22-23.
40. See, e.g., Cohen, The Social Transformation of Some American Ethics Committees, HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 21.
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mittees that hardly ever meet and wield no power at all.4t In fact,
few people may even know of the committee's existence. On the
other hand, some committees are very well known, consulted often,
and enormously influential.42
Despite this variation, when someone does consult a function-
ing committee in a difficult case, the committee's conclusions may
have a substantial impact.43 For example, in a case in which the at-
tending physician and the family of an incompetent patient disagree
over a treatment choice-a common scenario for ethics committee
consultation-committee support for the physician's recommenda-
tion is likely to seem a nearly insuperable obstacle to the family.
There will be many families convinced simply to stop fighting at that
point. The committee's advice may have such a psychological im-
pact on the disputants and carry so much weight within the institu-
tion that the advice is determinative.
In addition, limitations on the family's resources may make the
committee's advice the last word. This is particularly so for families
without the financial means to trigger judicial review. For these, the
position taken by the hospital may determine the treatment course.
The theoretical availability of judicial review is of no practical
help.44
Finally, it is difficult to maintain that ethics committees are
purely advisory when courts themselves have on occasion taken cog-
nizance of committee determinations. Committee determinations
can have an impact on subsequent court proceedings. Some courts
have indicated that ethics committee determinations may be re-
ceived as evidence. 45 Indeed, a close reading of these opinions indi-
cates that not only may the determination be received into evidence,
but it may also be accorded some degree of deference by the
41. See Hoffmann, supra note 8, at 757, 758.
42. See id at 757-58.
43. Ritchie has come to parallel conclusions: "The institutional force of some [ethics
committee] recommendations is so strong that they are, in effect, mandatory." Ritchie,
supra note 17, at 25.
44. Cf. Lantos, Miles & Cassel, The Linares Affair, 17 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 308,
314 (1989) (reporting on a case in which "the hospital requested that the family obtain a
court order to withdraw the respirator, a request that this family was ill-equipped and
financially unable to undertake"; rather than go to court, a family member removed the
patient's ventilator while holding health care personnel at bay with a gun).
45. See Wolf, Ethics Committees in the Courts, supra note 16, at 13-14 (citing In re Torres,
357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); and
Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977)-
cases indicating that ethics committee determinations may be received as evidence in
court and may be accorded some degree of deference by the judge).
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court.46 In some unreported cases as well, judges have sought the
opinion of the ethics committee. 47 All of this means that the com-
mittee's determination may have an impact on the court proceed-
ings, whether the court takes cognizance explicitly and on the
record or sub rosa.48
Indeed, some of the proponents of ethics committees have
sought such influence for them.49 One article, for example, sug-
gests that ethics committees adjust the way they operate so as to
enhance the chances that a court will give substantial weight to the
committee's conclusions: "[L]ike an appeals court reviewing a
lower court's transcript, a court which can see that the [institutional
ethics committee] promoted good decision-making practices is
more likely to endorse the recommendation of that committee. ' 50
Another article states, "It is predicted that most ethics committees
will make recommendations in particular cases and that the courts
will respect them. ' 5 1
In view of all of these ambitions and realities, it seems disingen-
uous to maintain nonetheless that ethics committees are purely
advisory mechanisms and so relieve them of due process require-
46. I am grateful to Jay Katz for suggesting to me that the risk of judicial deference
to ethics committee determinations is heightened by the long history of judicial defer-
ence to physicians generally. See generally J. KATz, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND
PATIENT 83 (1984). Courts have often used a professional judgment standard, regarding
physicians themselves as the best arbiters of what constitutes proper medical practice.
See id. But see Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972) (a
landmark opinion limiting deference). Thus courts may fall into the trap of seeing ethics
committees as the best arbiters of what constitutes an appropriate treatment decision.
Cf. Delgado & McAllen, Moralist as Expert Witness, 63 B.U.L. REV. 869 (1982) (detailing
risks of misguided deference to the testimony of expert ethicists).
47. See Wolf, supra note 16, at 15 n.5. Diane Hoffmann also discusses courts' willing-
ness to take ethics committee decisions into consideration. See Hoffmann, supra note 8,
at 780.
48. There is, or should be, significant concern about unreported contact between
judges and ethics committees or ethics committee personnel. One obvious danger is
that the judge may base her ultimate decision on opinions, statements, or conclusions
that have not been documented on the record and open to challenge by the parties. But
an additional danger is that the judge may attribute unwarranted and inappropriate
weight to the advice of those supposedly expert in moral matters. See Delgado & McAl-
len, supra note 46, at 898-99.
49. This set of ambitions is quite evident in the ethics committee literature. See, e.g.,
Bayley & Cranford, supra note 20, at 193; see also Cranford, Hester & Ashley, supra note
10, at 53, 59.
50. Cranford, Hester & Ashley, supra note 10, at 53.
51. Lo, supra note 10, at 46; see also Bayley & Cranford, supra note 20, at 198 ("We
expect that courts will increasingly rely on recommendations from ethics committees
.... .).
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ments.52 That permits the committee to operate in an unbridled
fashion, subject to no governing process standards. Shielded by
protests that it lacks decisionmaking power, the committee may ac-
tually wield enormous power. At the clinical level, the committee
may effectively have the last word; in litigated cases, the committee
may have a substantial influence over court disposition.
C. The Myth That Committees are Good for Patients
There is an extremely widespread presumption that ethics com-
mittees are good for patients. Commentators seldom even feel the
need to state it explicitly. After all, ethics committees are meant to
promote ethical decisionmaking, and ethically correct treatment de-
cisions will assign priority to the patient's good. Occasionally a
commentator does manage to articulate the presumption explicitly,
as when one states, "Institutional ethics committees serve the needs
of patients." ' Indeed, the President's Commission recommends
committees because they can serve those needs. 4 Others have
gone further, arguing that the only proper purpose of an ethics
committee, when consulting on real cases, is patient protection.
Ruth Macklin has articulated this forcefully: "The rights and wel-
fare of patients should take precedence over other, competing con-
cerns, however relevant and important: the risk of medicolegal
liability for the hospital and its personnel; the autonomy and author-
ity of physicians in the institution; conscientious moral objections by
nurses or other staff .... 5
Yet even a cursory look at the facts about ethics committees will
cast grave doubts on a claim that ethics committees do protect pa-
tients' rights and interests. A survey published in 1984 showed that
most patients did not even know about the existence of these ethics
committees. 56 Another survey published around the same time by
the same group revealed that most committees did not permit the
52. Cf PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT,
supra note 4, at 168 ("[I]f a major advantage of institutional ethics committees is that
they will provide an alternative to court review in most cases, careful attention must be
paid to the acceptability of the committees within existing legal structures.").
53. Wikler, Institutional Agendas and Ethics Committees, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-
Oct. 1989, at 21.
54. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT,
supra note 4, at 5.
55. Macklin, Consultative Roles and Responsibilities, in INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMIT-
TEES, supra note 10, at 158.
56. See Youngner, Coultoji, Juknialis & Jackson, supra note 10, at 24.
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patient to attend the committee's meeting. 7 Nor did most commit-
tees permit a patient to trigger an ethics committee consultation.5 8
Instead, what the researchers found is that physicians and other
health care professionals controlled all aspects of committee func-
tioning. Most members of ethics committees were physicians, with
some committees comprised entirely of physicians. 59 All commit-
tees surveyed allowed the physician in charge of the case to trigger
committee consultation and to attend the committee's meeting.6°
The researchers concluded that "[t]he composition and function of
committees . . . would not allay many of the concerns of patients'
rights advocates about patient representation and control. Commit-
tees were clearly dominated by physicians and other health profes-
sionals."' 6 ' Other authors since have reinforced the conclusion by
adding to the roster of concerns. The patient may receive no notice
that her case is going before the committee,6 2 and may not be asked
for her permission before confidential information about the case is
shared with the committee.6 3
Of course, one might argue that all of this is no problem. If
physicians and patients have identical interests and physicians can
be counted upon to champion those interests, then a committee
dominated by physicians will seek the patient's good even if patients
themselves are entirely excluded. However, the proposition that
physicians and patients have identical interests has been widely
rejected.'
Traditionally physicians have indeed undertaken to act for the
benefit of their patients. 65 But one of the major tasks of modern
medical ethics has been to discredit the idea that what the physician
thinks will benefit the patient is necessarily the same as what the
patient thinks. The physician, for example, may want to try an ag-
gressive therapy to improve the patient's condition. The patient,
however, may wish to reject it, feeling that she has had enough. The
physician and patient will often see a treatment choice in different
57. See Youngner, Jackson, Couton, Juknialis & Smith, A National Survey, supra note
24, at 904.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 903.
60. See id. at 904.
61. Id.
62. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
63. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT,
supra note 4, at 167-68; infra note 170.
64. SeeJ. KATz, supra note 46, at 99-100; infra text accompanying note 115; GUIDE-
LINES, supra note 25, at 9.
65. See J. KATz, supra note 46, at 4.
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terms. The physician is likely to concentrate on medical effective-
ness, while the patient is likely to concentrate on whether the pro-
spective benefits of treatment outweigh the physical, psychological,
and other burdens to her.
The consensus in law and ethics has been that it is the patient,
not the physician, who ultimately has the right to determine whether
treatment is utilized or foregone. In law, this concept is manifested
in the fundamental requirement of informed consent.6 6 In ethics,
this notion of the patient's right to decide flows from the principle
of autonomy or self-determination. Thus, it is extremely troubling
that ethics committees would claim to serve the needs and interests
of patients and yet exclude them from the committee room. At best
it seems that ethics committees serve the needs of patients as physi-
cians understand those needs. Yet what is likely to trigger ethics
committee consultation is precisely a conflict between the patient
(or her surrogate) and the physician. Consequently, the committee
is hearing only the physician's perspective. Moreover, the treating
physician, as well as the health care professionals on the committee,
inevitably will bring into the room their own needs-as persons,
professionals, and members of the health care institution. When the
committee is dominated by health care professionals, hears only
from other health care professionals, and excludes the patient her-
self, it certainly appears that the committee is serving the needs of
the health care professionals, not the patient.6 7
Thus when a case comes before the committee in which there is
disagreement between physician and patient, it is not at all clear that
the committee will function so as to protect the patient. Certainly
some committees have done so. Yet there is no general assurance
that committees will, and the evidence is overwhelming that the
voices and needs of health care professionals may well dominate
instead.
II. IDENTIFYING THE REIGNING AMBIVALENCE
Thus far I have argued that the dominant set of beliefs about
66. See infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
67. There is much in the literature that confirms this. A group from Massachusetts
General Hospital in Boston, reporting on the benefits of their ethics committee, listed,
"above all, maximizing support for the responsible physician." Optimum Care for Hope-
lessly Ill Patients: A Report of the Clinical Care Committee of the Massachusetts General Hospital,
295 NEw ENG. J. MED. 362, 364 (1976). Subsequent commentators have gone even fur-
ther. Cynthia Cohen reports, "The structure of some committees has been designed to
protect institutional interests .... " Cohen, supra note 40, at 21.
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ethics committees is false-in fact, committees are no longer in their
infancy, they have sought and can wield determinative power in
treatment disputes, and they can harm the interests and rights of
patients. Once the myth of the advisory and harmless committee
has been dispelled, and the potential power of these committees is
clear, then what procedural standards should be imposed? In order
to answer that question, it is necessary to articulate the proper func-
tion of ethics committees.
Part II scrutinizes and critiques the two visions usually offered
of what ethics committee functions and process should be. The first
section of Part II identifies these two alternative models. The sec-
ond section claims that ethics committees flip back and forth be-
tween these two models, displaying features of each. The third
section argues that this double identity is dangerous for patients.
The last section seeks the roots of this double identity and finds
them in a persistent ambivalence about shifting power away from
caregivers to patients, and in the difficulty of combining attention to
rights with the task of sustaining caregiving.
A. The Two Models
Those who write about ethics committees have offered two fun-
damentally different views of these committees. According to one
vision, ethics committees should be consultative bodies providing
ethical advice to caregivers. This vision likens ethics committees
either to other hospital committees that also advise caregivers or to
individual medical professionals providing a consultation.6 8 On the
basis of either analogy, the appropriate committee process is de-
picted as informal, with no procedural protections for patients. In-
deed, there may be no effort to include patients at all. Because this
vision prescribes for ethics committees a function and process like
that pursued when other hospital committees or individuals are con-
sulted, I label this the Consultation Model.69 This model focuses on
68. See, e.g., Veatch, supra note 28, at 20, 21 (discussing the fact that others analogize
use of an ethics committee to intrahospital consultation or to tissue and quality assur-
ance committees); Fleetwood, Arnold & Baron, Giving Answers or Raising Questions?: The
Problematic Role of institutional Ethics Committees, 15 J. MED. ETHIcs 137, 138 (1989) (liken-
ing committees to individual colleagues, whom treating physicians often consult about
their cases); Merritt, supra note 10, at 1243 ("most committees serve as consultative bod-
ies with whom the attending physician may discuss current ethical dilemmas as in the
treatment of specific patients" (footnote omitted)).
69. I am not arguing that ethics committees are identical to other kinds of hospital
committees. Commentators have noted some of the differences. See, e.g., Merritt, supra
note 10, at 1258-63; Cranford, Hester & Ashley, supra note 10, at 58. I am arguing that
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serving caregivers and sustaining their delivery of care.
The other vision of ethics committee function and process fo-
cuses on their capacity to resolve disputes and on the power they
wield. Instead of analogizing ethics committees to other hospital
committees or to consultants, this vision likens them to courts.
Thus, the appropriate committee process is depicted as court-like,
providing procedural protections to safeguard patients' rights. In-
deed, some versions of this model would remove the committee
from the hospital altogether, in order to ensure its independence of
judgment. Because this vision prescribes for committees a function
and process like that of adjudicatory bodies, I call this the Adjudica-
tory Model. This model focuses on resolving disputes in a way that
protects patients' rights.
I label these "models," but I am discussing something more
than simply abstract outlines of what these committees could be.
These two different models are alternative mind sets or gestalts.
Thus, in identifying these two models, I am trying to perform a kind
of archeology, digging deeper than the usual discussion of ethics
committees to explore two fundamentally different approaches.
1. The Consultation Model .- The Consultation Model is familiar
to caregivers, whether it is manifest in the work of committees or
individual consultants. Hospitals are full of committees. Indeed,
some of these committees sit to perform a function in some ways
quite similar to that of ethics committees-they sit to review hard
cases. These committees are intended to be collegial arenas in
which caregivers can bring difficult cases for review, feedback, and
advice. Patients and families play no part in these meetings, unless a
patient is viewed in order literally to flesh out the problem. Ordina-
rily, patients and their families would not even be aware that the
patient's case was being reviewed. In fact, review might not occur
until after a patient's death. That is consistent, though, with the
purposes of this model-staff education, staff support, guidance for
tough cases, and quality control.
The Consultation Model in its key features operates similarly
when the consultant is an individual. It is quite common for a pa-
tient's attending physician to enlist the services of another profes-
sional as a consultant. The consultant may be another physician
with more specialized knowledge in a relevant area, or a non-physi-
there are some similarities, and most important, that medical personnel often see ethics
committees as being like other committees (whether rightly or wrongly) and construct
ethics committee processes accordingly.
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cian professional with other expertise. Again, the process typically
excludes the patient or involves her only minimally. The consultant
may need to perform a physical examination of the patient or ask
her a few questions. But the person to whom the consultant reports
is the physician who requested the consult. The consultant supple-
ments the physician's expertise, providing guidance and advice.
Ethics committees could operate as these committees and con-
sultants do. In the privacy of the committee, staff members could
seek advice and support from their colleagues on difficult cases.7 °
Under this model, the committee would function as helpmate to the
staff; patients and their surrogates would play no role at all. Indeed,
they would often have no idea the case was before the committee. 7t
John Robertson has laid out the process details of this model.
He calls this type of committee "optional/optional," meaning that
the physician has the option of consulting the committee and the
option of following its advice. According to Robertson, this kind of
committee exists to help physicians, nurses, and others with ethical
problems. 72 Robertson lays out the committee process correspond-
ing to this function, an informal process providing no procedural
protections for the patient:
As an optional/optional advisory body, the commit-
tee's proceedings need not be formal .... [NIothing writ-
ten need be submitted, and no records need to be kept.
There is no reason for this procedure to be public or open
because it is simply an advisory mechanism for members of
the health care team. Nor would a committee ... have to
notify the patient, much less get his or her permission to
70. Merritt describes in detail this vision of the ethics committee as servant to the
physician rather than the patient:
Some ethics committees . . . may view their "clients" as the doctors who
consult them, rather than the patients affected by their advice. These commit-
tees may perceive their role as helping doctors manage the risks of medical
practice rather than furthering the interests of patients. The physicians, too,
may view themselves, rather than the patient, as the committee's client.
Merritt, supra note 10, at 1284 (footnotes omitted). Merritt goes on to say that "if the
committee's role. .. extends to helping physicians avoid 'unethical' as well as technically
unlawful conduct, the primary constituency of the committee is arguably the physicians
who request the committee's aid, not the patients who are ultimately affected by the
decisions." Id. at 1284 n.172.
71. Cf. Fost & Cranford, supra note 10, at 2689 ("If the primary function of the [eth-
ics committee] is to be advisory to the attending physician, apologies should not be
needed for the physician's desire to have a free and uninhibited consultation.").
72. Robertson, Committees as Decision Makers: Alternative Structures and Responsibilities, in
INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMrIrEES, supra note 10, at 87.
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consider the case . . .7
Thus the envisioned process accords no notice to the patient and no
opportunity to participate in the committee's proceedings. Instead,
the health care professionals are all free to act as they do when phy-
sicians seek medical consultations and the advice of other hospital
committees.
2. The Adjudicatory Model.-Ethics committees might, however,
operate using a very different model. Under the Adjudicatory
Model the committee operates something like a court. This is far
less familiar to caregivers than the Consultation Model approach.
The Adjudicatory Model emphasizes the committee's role in resolv-
ing disputes between patients and caregivers. Indeed, under this
model the committee may go so far as to decide between the war-
ring positions. Thus the patient must be involved in the commit-
tee's proceedings and her rights protected.
John Robertson lays out a version of this contrasting model as
well, what he calls the "mandatory/mandatory" committee:
[T]he form and procedures of a mandatory ethics commit-
tee will differ in some important respects from those of the
optional/optional committee. When the committee is op-
tional/optional, it functions as a consultant. It is there to
facilitate the physician's independent moral inquiry. How-
ever, when it becomes mandatory, the committee functions
.74more like a decision maker ....
Thus the committee acting under this model is obliged to give the
patient notice and an opportunity to be heard. Indeed, Robertson
goes so far in depicting a court-like model that he concludes the
committee's proceedings should be open to public scrutiny.75
George Annas is even more explicit in making the analogy be-
tween a committee that is proceeding pursuant to this model and a
court:
[I]f the ethics committee is to make a decision about
whether a [patient] is to be treated or not, the committee
must meet the requirements of basic due process. The eth-
ics committee would have to act like an administrative
agency that is set up to make decisions usually made by the
73. Id. at 89.
74. Id. at 93.
75. See id.
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courts.
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Thus Annas raises the possibility that committees following this
model might be constitutionally obligated to accord all the proce-
dural protections a court would give.
In developing this Adjudicatory Model, both Robertson and
Annas hinge a great deal on the single fact that the committee's rec-
ommendation is binding; it is this that provokes them to require due
process protections. But others have articulated versions of this
model without strictly requiring that. Bernard Lo advocates many
procedural due process protections simply because ethics commit-
tees are seeking to serve as an alternative to the courts in perform-
ing a dispute resolution function.77
Thus the Adjudicatory Model focuses on the committee's role
in resolving treatment disputes between patient and caregiver.
Whether or not the committee's determination is binding strictly
speaking, the committee is seen as having an obligation to discharge
its functions fairly. Under this model the patient participates di-
rectly in the committee's proceedings. The committee undertakes
an obligation to protect that patient's rights. Whereas the Consulta-
tion Model emphasizes support of caregivers, the Adjudicatory
Model emphasizes the protection of patients' rights.
These models offer two very different pictures of process, and
an ethics committee could pursue either one.78 To illustrate how
76. Annas, Legal Aspects of Ethics Committees, in INSTITTIMONAL ETHics COMMITrEES,
supra note 10, at 56.
77. See Lo, supra note 10, at 47. After enumerating procedural protections provided
by the "legal system," Lo states:
Ethics committees that make recommendations may not need safeguards that
are as elaborate as those in a legal system that makes binding decisions. But for
ethics committees to be accepted as a quicker and less acrimonious alternative
to the courts, they must be perceived to be as fair as the courts. Id.
78. Judith Wilson Ross argues as well that there are alternative models for ethics
committee case consultations. Ross, Why Cases Sometimes Go Wrong, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 22. However, she identifies three, rather than two models: con-
sultation comparable to a medical consultation, case review in a fashion "indebted to the
legal system," and education fashioned on a "counseling model." Her first and third
models come closest to my Consultation Model. Under both her first and third models
the committee is giving advice rather than determining the matter, and Ross is clear that
under the first model the committee is serving the primary physician. Neither her first
nor third model involves any attention to procedural niceties. She contrasts both with
the model "indebted to the legal system," which has clear affinity with my Adjudicatory
Model.
John Robertson elucidated a now famous four-way scheme for classifying ethics
committees in an article in 1984. See Robertson, supra note 72; see also text infra pp. 816-
17. He focused first on whether ethics committee review was optional or mandatory,
and second on whether following the ethics committee's recommendation was optional
ETHics COMMITrEES AND DUE PROCESS
different they are, consider a hypothetical case that might well come
before an ethics committee. Say that a patient with amyotrophic lat-
eral sclerosis (ALS), an inevitably fatal disease characterized by neu-
romuscular degeneration, and commonly called "Lou Gehrig's
Disease," is approaching the point of needing mechanical ventila-
tion to compensate for failing respiratory capacity. The patient
wants to refuse the ventilator and any other life-sustaining treat-
ment, to allow the disease to take its course. The physician, how-
ever, resists. She insists that the patient could live for years more if
the patient were willing to become respirator dependent. Efforts to
resolve the conflict in conversation between patient and doctor fail.
This is actually quite typical of the sorts of cases that go before eth-
ics committees. Many of those cases concern disputes over the re-
fusal of life-sustaining treatment. Indeed, a number of the litigated
cases concerning the termination of treatment have dealt specifically
with patients who have ALS and wish to refuse mechanical
ventilation.79
The ethics committee's consideration of the case will look quite
different, depending on whether the committee is pursuing the Con-
sultation Model or the Adjudicatory Model. In purest form, adher-
ence to the Consultation Model would mean that the ethics
committee was functioning essentially as an in-house advisor to the
institution's staff. Thus the treating physician would bring the case
to the committee for review. The patient might not even be aware
of this, would have no opportunity to consent to the process, and
might well never know the conclusions reached. This whole process
would operate for the benefit of the primary caregiver, in her efforts
to deliver good patient care. It also might function to protect other
staff and the caregiving institution as a whole.
Pursuit of the Adjudicatory Model would be quite a different
process. The committee would focus on resolving the dispute be-
tween patient and caregiver. The committee's pre-eminent concern
or mandatory. Consequently, he generated four possible designs for an ethics commit-
tee: optional/optional, optional/mandatory, mandatory/optional, and mandatory/
mandatory.
Although Ross generates three models and Robertson four, this article focuses on
two alternatives. This is grounded in my claim that historically there have been two
alternative pictures that have dominated the thinking about ethics committees. Robert-
son's article in fact bears this out. Although he identifies four distinct ways committees
could be set up by a hospital, when he describes how they would work and what their
procedures would be, he actually describes two models, which correspond to my Con-
sultation Model and Adjudicatory Model. I quote Robertson at length in the text
describing the two. See supra pp. 816-17.
79. See, e.g., In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987).
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would need to be how to do that properly, in a way sufficiently pro-
tective of the patient. The patient would obviously have to know
that her case was coming before the committee. She would also
have to be able to participate. Finally, she would have to be able to
challenge the committee's process and substantive decision. These
necessities would dictate at least some, if not all of the procedural
protections that Robertson and Annas enumerate.
From the point of view of the patient, there is a stark contrast
between these two models. The contrast is less pronounced from
the caregiver's standpoint. Under either model the physician would
be well aware of and an active participant in the committee process.
It is the patient's participation that is affected radically.
B. Where Ethics Committees Stand-A Double Identity
If ethics committees can pursue either a Consultation Model
advising caregivers or an Adjudicatory Model resolving disputes,
which is it they do pursue? I suggest that they partake of both, pur-
suing sometimes one, and sometimes the other. Indeed, a single
committee can alternate between the two. One minute the members
will see the group as a committee advising caregivers; the next min-
ute they will see it as a body resolving or actually deciding treatment
disputes. A close look at ethics committees shows that they have no
single clear identity, but rather have a double identity, with the ca-
pacity to alternate. As suggested above, it is rather like an Escher
print-one minute fish and the next minute fowl.
This double identity is evident in a number of ways. First, eth-
ics committees serve two sets of masters. They sit to advise their
own hospital staff on difficult cases, that is, to serve their colleagues
and institution. Yet they also may claim to serve the patient by at-
tending to her needs and interests. Thus, in keeping with the Con-
sultation Model, the ethics committee's foremost concern is
sometimes the physician or other troubled caregiver. Yet in keeping
with the Adjudicatory Model, the foremost concern at other times is
the patient. The scholarly literature reflects this schizophrenia. s It
lauds the ethics committee as a safe place in which caregivers can
seek advice and support,8 ' even suggesting that committee delibera-
tions be shielded from public view and their records be beyond sub-
80. See, e.g., Wikler, supra note 53, at 21 ("Institutional ethics committees serve the
needs of patients. They also help doctors and nurses .... "); Cranford & Doudera, supra
note 18, at 13 ("The committee ... [serves] as a resource . .. for staff and families.").
81. See, e.g., Fost & Cranford, supra note 10, at 2689; infra note 70.
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poena and discovery.82 Yet the literature also praises committees
for their capacity to act as defenders of patients' rights and inter-
ests. 3 Realistically, a committee cannot simultaneously serve pa-
tients above all and clinicians above all. 4 Usually, the ethics
committee is consulted precisely because there is a conflict between
what the physician wants and what the patient or her surrogate
wants. Thus the committee must serve primarily the needs of one
or the other.8 5 Some committees may habitually favor one pattern;
others may alternate between the two.8 6
Matters are similarly confused when you examine not whom the
committee serves, but what power it is wielding. Sometimes com-
mittees seem to be merely providing advice, and sometimes they
seem to be actually resolving treatment disputes. As noted above,
committees often claim they are purely advisory. Nonetheless they
may seek to exercise enormous and even determinative influence
over the final treatment decision. Even though the language of "ad-
visory" dominates, to the point that Maryland's statute labels them
"advisory committee[s],"8s references to ethics committees as actual
decisionmakers keep bobbing up here and there like a buoy that no
one can keep submerged underwater too long.88
Similarly, confusion reigns when you look at the committee's
method of operation. One minute the committee is operating like
other hospital committees or individual consultants, advising and
educating hospital staff. The next minute the committee is talking
patients' rights and may even be defacto adjudicating disputes. Yet
as committees pursue one or the other vision, or indeed alternate,
there is no sign they clearly declare it or even mark the shift. Both
processes are going on with the same people, sitting in the same
82. See Fost & Cranford, supra note 10, at 2689-90.
83. See, e.g., Bayley & Cranford, supra note 20, at 196.
84. Jonathan Moreno makes a similar point in asking: "What counts as an excellent
ethics committee? ... One that is viewed by health care providers as friendly and sup-
portive of their problems or one that is seen by patients as friendly and supportive of
their problems?" Moreno, supra note 39, at 897.
85. Cf. Annas, supra note 76, at 52 (The "primary function [of committees] is usually
either to protect the institution (and the people who work at the institution) or to pro-
tect patients. We have seen both kinds, although the ones designed to protect institu-
tions are more prevalent.").
86. Cf. Ross, supra note 78, at 23 (enumerating three models and observing that eth-
ics committees may alternate or mix them).
87. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 19-370(c) (1990 & Supp. 1990).
88. See, e.g., HAw. REV. STAT. § 663-1.7 (1988 & Supp. 1990); PRESIDENT's COMMIS-
SION, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 4, at 164 ("[E]thics
committees might be actual decisionmakers. The Commission's study revealed that...
slightly more than 30% classified this as an actual function." (footnotes omitted)).
1991]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
meeting room, with no discernable shift in gear. Thus, they may not
alter their processes. The committee serving as advisor to
caregivers and according no procedural protections to patients may
then seek to resolve a treatment dispute, but do so without switch-
ing gears into a procedural mode that accords due process. Judith
Wilson Ross makes a similar point: "Individuals or entire commit-
tees may use one of these models for one case, another for a second
case. Or they may mix them in a single discussion. Furthermore,
the term identifying the model being used may not reflect what is
actually being done."89 Some might praise this as flexibility, excit-
ing experimentation by a phenomenon in its infancy. I argue that it
is dangerous.
C. The Dangers of a Double Identity
Because of this double identity of ethics committees, and their
ability to alternate, patients face serious problems in dealing with
ethics committees. Patients will never know precisely where they
stand. The committee may talk as if it serves patients, but the reality
may be something else again. The committee may not yet have
sorted out the confusion involved in claiming to serve both patients
and caregivers. Indeed, the committee may be laboring under the
delusion that serving caregivers is serving patients, that their inter-
ests are identical. Thus the committee actually may not serve pa-
tients, but serve caregivers instead. Yet the patient may not realize
that, and may rely on assurances that the committee serves her
interests.
Moreover, the committee may claim that it is purely advisory,
and thereby discourage the patient from demanding full participa-
tion and procedural protections. Yet the committee may wield sub-
stantial and even decisive power. It may actually be the patient's
forum of last resort, or a significant influence on subsequent
litigation.
Finally, the committee may talk the language of "rights" but
actually give none.°" Committees will inevitably spend a great deal
89. See Ross, supra note 78, at 23.
90. For an exceedingly insightful treatment of the gap between the rhetoric of pa-
tients' rights and practice, see J. KATz, supra note 46. On a much smaller scale, I dis-
cussed this gap in analyzing Frederick Wiseman's film "Near Death," a nearly six-hour
documentary showing the practice in one hospital's medical intensive care unit. See
Wolf, "Near Death"--In the Moment of Decision, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 208 (1990); see also
Wolf, Trying Not to Talk Forever: A Tool for Change, 15 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 248
(1987/1988).
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of time discussing patients' rights. These are, after all, ethics com-
mittees and there is tremendous consensus that medical ethics de-
mands respect for those rights. Ethics committees may even
proclaim their mission to be protection of patients' rights.9' Yet at
the same time the committee may accord no procedural protections
at all, not even notice and a chance to participate in the committee's
proceedings. Instead, the committee members may believe they can
adequately comprehend the patient's position and protect her rights
without her participation.
There is real danger to the patient here. Most patients are in
the hospital because they are sick or disabled. Having come to the
hospital seeking help, support, and care, they are vulnerable and in
need. Now a committee comprised mostly or entirely of caregivers
assures the patient that she has nothing to fear from them, that her
welfare is their uppermost concern. She has every reason to believe
them. She probably has no prior experience with that or any other
ethics committee. Moreover, since the committee is a part of the
health care institution caring for her, she will have substantial moti-
vation not to make demands that may antagonize the committee
members. There will be strong incentives to accept and go along
with whatever the committee tells her.92
The patient who does "go along" will be failing to insist on the
protections of the Adjudicatory Model. In truth, she is in a poor
position to recognize the need for those protections and demand
them. We cannot expect the patient, the most vulnerable and least
powerful actor in this whole drama, to spot the inconsistencies in
the script and insist that it be rewritten. She is not in control.
The danger to the patient is all the greater because the commit-
tee members themselves may sincerely not see the danger they are
posing to the patient. They may truly believe the committee is serv-
ing patients, but may actually first and foremost be serving the
needs of caregivers. Moreover, committee members may believe
the committee is simply advisory, but may labor to determine the
outcome of disputed treatment decisions, and may even strive to af-
fect subsequent judicial disposition. Finally, the committee may be-
lieve the committee is acting to protect patients' rights, but fail to
accord even the rudimentary protections of notice and the chance to
91. Cf. Macklin, supra note 55, at 158 (arguing that ethics committees should recog-
nize that their "primary responsibility is to protect the rights and welfare of patients").
92. Cf. Wolf, Conflict Between Doctor and Patient, 16 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 197,
201 (1988) ("The patient ... being the more dependent, may feel that any disagreement
with or challenge to the physician is forbidden.").
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be heard. It is the committee's well-meaning sincerity that may
blind it to the problem.
D. The Roots of this Double Identity: The Reigning Ambivalence
It is no accident that ethics committees are trapped in a kind of
double-identity, partaking of both the Consultation Model and the
Adjudicatory Model. Nor is the attendant confusion in the minds of
patients, surrogates, and committee members themselves fortui-
tous. It reflects a broader history of reform, of which committees
are a part. The rise of patients' rights, both in law and ethics, insti-
gated a revolution not yet completed. The double-identity of ethics
committees graphically demonstrates a transition still in progress, a
revolution in the throes, with all the ambivalence one might expect.
Because of this history, there is in the world of clinical decisionmak-
ing (as in many other realms) a very troubled effort under way to
reconcile the reforming language of patient rights and autonomy
with the language of caring and community.
Efforts to reform the doctor/patient relationship and to shift
the locus of decisionmaking power away from physicians to their pa-
tients significantly predate the rise of ethics committees. Probably
the line most cited in medical jurisprudence in support of patients'
rights was written by Justice Cardozo in 1914: "Every human being
of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body." 9s Jay Katz has traced the subsequent de-
velopment of the doctrine of "informed consent"-the notion that
physicians have affirmative obligations to disclose information to
their patients and to seek the patient's consent for treatment. 94 Par-
allel with these legal developments, modern biomedical ethics arose
as a serious field of endeavor and as a reforming movement. While
the case law was giving birth to "informed consent" in a period Katz
dates as 1957-72,"s works such as Paul Ramsey's The Patient as Person
were beginning to appear.96 Both law and ethics began to demand
transformation in medical relationships, rejecting the traditional ap-
proach of physician-knows-best in favor of patients' rights to make
treatment decisions.
It is no exaggeration to call this revolutionary. Katz has
93. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914).
94. See J. KATz, supra note 46, at 48-84.
95. See id. at 49.
96. P. RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON (1970).
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demonstrated that physician paternalism9" and silence were built
into the long history of medicine. Now physicians were being asked
to yield information and surrender decisionmaking authority.
Moreover, they were asked to hand all of this over to the very per-
son they had been laboring to shield from the truth and the weight
of decision-the patient.
It was unreasonable to think that this revolution would happen
easily. In fact, there has been great resistance to this change. Physi-
cian resistance, while not complete by any means, has manifested
itself in numerous ways. Most recently it has erupted in new at-
tempts to carve out areas-such as the realm of "futile treatment"-
in which physicians claim to be entitled to make treatment decisions
without the patient's involvement.98
97. I have opted to use the traditional term "paternalism" in this article rather than
the gender-neutral "parentalism." One could argue that the latter is the proper term,
since certainly female physicians can demonstrate the "doctor-knows-best" approach
that typifies traditional paternalism. Yet the traditional roles of dominant physician and
submissive patient may in part be a product of the historical fact that most doctors have
been men and most patients women. Thus it may be very important to retain a
gendered term to refer to this tradition of domination. I am indebted to Susan Sherwin
for bringing home to me the notion that the patient's traditional role may be fundamen-
tally gendered. Sherwin, oral presentation, Hastings Center Project Meeting on "Femi-
nism & Bioethics: Beyond Reproduction," Nov. 1990. See generally Sherwin, Feminist and
Medical Ethics: Two Different Approaches to Contextual Ethics, 4 HYPATIA 57 (1989). See also B.
EHRENREICH & D. ENGLISH, FOR HER OWN GOOD: 150 YEARS OF THE EXPERTS' ADVICE
TO WOMEN (1989); S. FISHER, IN THE PATIENT'S BEST INTEREST: WOMEN AND THE POLI-
TICS OF MEDICAL DECiSiONS (1988); A.D. TODD, INTIMATE ADVERSARIES: CULTURAL CON-
FLICT BETWEEN DOCTORS AND WOMEN PATIENTS (1989). Cf Miles & August, Courts,
Gender and "The Right to Die," 18 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 85, 85 (1990) (concluding
that judges' views on patients in "right to die" cases are fundamentally gendered).
98. See Wolf, Conflict Between Doctor and Patient, supra note 92, at 198 ("There are
newer manifestations too of the strong urge to let physicians off the hook--to enable
them to avoid at least some areas of conversation and confrontation with their patients.
One good example is the recent debate over the notion of futility."). For more on the
futility debate, see, e.g., Lantos, Singer, Walker, Gramelspacher, Shapiro, Sanchez-Gon-
zales, Stocking, Miles & Siegler, The Illusion of Futility in Clinical Practice, 87 AM. J. MED. 81
(1989); Youngner, Who Defines Futility?, 260J. A.M.A. 2094 (1988). For the recent erup-
tion of the futility debate in the courts, see Belkin, As Family Protests, Hospital Seeks an End
to Woman's Life Support, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1991, at Al, col. 1 (in order to avoid giving
"futile" medical care, a hospital plans to go to court).
Katz illuminates the deeper dynamic:
Treatment decisions are extremely complex and require a . . . sustained dia-
logue, one in which patients are viewed as participants in medical decisions
affecting their lives. This is not the view of most physicians, who believe in-
stead that patients are too ignorant to make decisions on their own behalf, that
disclosure increases patients' fears and reinforces 'foolish' decisions, and that
informing them about the uncertainties of medical interventions in many in-
stances seriously undermines faith so essential to the success of therapy.
Therefore, physicians asserted that they must be the ultimate decision makers.
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Ethics committees are themselves an outgrowth of the revolu-
tionary attempt to bring modem medical ethics into the clinic and
recognize patients' rights. The idea that a group of people would
scrutinize the ethics of treatment decisions, and possibly criticize the
attending physician, was itself a blow to absolute physician author-
ity. In fact, articles on ethics committees anticipated and tried to
respond to physician resentment.99 Thus the mere existence of
these committees was revolutionary.
Beyond that, the substantive ethical principles these commit-
tees were supposed to apply promoted patients' rights. By the time
the Quinlan decision gave ethics committees their first major en-
dorsement in 1976, t00 and certainly by the time the President's
Commission on biomedical ethics offered its qualified endorsement
of ethics committees in 1983," ° ' there was widespread agreement
on the basic ethical principles that should guide treatment deci-
sions. This was especially true in the realm of decisions about
whether to forgo life-sustaining treatment. 0 2 Consensus has been
particularly strong in that domain probably because it has been the
focus of the most concentrated work in modem biomedical ethics
and the subject of a great many judicial decisions. Cases about life-
sustaining treatment have consistently dominated the agendas of
ethics committees, so these committees have been operating in an
area in which a consensus has been achieved that embraces ethical
principles protecting patients' rights to decide.
Thus the very existence of ethics committees and the ethical
J. KATz, supra note 46, at 83. It is worth noting that Katz himself is a physician.
99. See, e.g., Lo, supra note 10, at 48 ("The committee may feel attacked by various
groups [including] attending physicians who fear that their power is being usurped
.... "); Fost & Cranford, supra note 10, at 2690 ("At present, most physicians appear
unlikely to consult such a group of their own volition .... This resistance suggests that
hospitals should initially establish a policy of voluntary consultation, with no decision-
making authority in the committee.").
100. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 50, 355 A.2d 647, 669, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
101. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT,
supra note 4, at 160-70.
102. See id. (setting forth the basic principles); see also GUIDELINES, supra note 25 (a
later formulation). Despite the widespread agreement, there has always been contro-
versy on some points. For example, there historically has been significant controversy
on whether termination of artificial nutrition and hydration should be governed by the
same ethical principles as the termination of other life-sustaining treatments such as
ventilators. That controversy has gradually been resolved in favor of governing all deci-
sions about whether to utilize life-sustaining treatment by the same basic principles.
The ethical controversy was substantially quieted by the pronouncement in Cruzan that
the same legal principles govern, whether the treatment in question is artificial nutrition
and hydration or another life-sustaining intervention. See 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2852 (1990).
[VOL. 50:798826
ETHICS COMMITrEES AND DUE PROCESS
principles they were meant to apply were pro-patient. Yet from the
start ethics committees have been mired in the same ambivalence
that has attended the rest of this attempted revolution in health
care. As others have recognized,10 3 the so-called "ethics commit-
tee" demanded by the Quinlan court was really to be a committee of
physicians convened merely to confirm the patient's prognosis.
Committees have continued to be physician dominated ever since.
As noted above, research in the early 1980s showed that most ethics
committee members were physicians, that most committees would
not permit patients to bring cases to the committee, nor would most
committees permit patients to attend meetings.'' Debates raged in
the literature about whether a patient should even be told that her
case was being considered by the committee, much less asked for
consent before confidential information was shared with this group
of strangers.1 0 5 Physician control was so pronounced that some
commentators declared forthrightly that the true purpose of ethics
committees was to serve the interests and needs of physicians. 0 6
Indeed, one commentator suggested that ethics committees were
not physician-dominated enough. He maintained that only clini-
cians should perform ethical consultations on clinical cases; consul-
tation by a committee whose membership included non-clinicians
was suspect. 10 7
Ethics committees thus have always been a battleground on
which traditional physician paternalism and control have gone head
to head with the newer commitment to patients' rights. To this day
the battle remains unresolved. That is the root of ethics commit-
tees' double identity. They spring from modem medical ethics and
its commitment to patients' rights, but have been thoroughly domi-
nated and shaped by physicians. Thus it is no surprise that the very
ambivalence that many (if not most) physicians feel toward ceding
decisional authority to patients is played out in the ethics commit-
tee. This is all the more predictable because the very cases that
come to the ethics committee are the hard cases, the ones in which
there is some dispute between the doctor and patient or patient's
103. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREAT-
MENT, supra note 4, at 162.
104. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., Veatch, The Ethics of lnstitutional Ethics Committees, in INSTITUTIONAL ETH-
ICS COMMITrEES, supra note 10, at 36; Robertson, supra note 72, at 89.
106. See, e.g., supra note 70; Fost & Cranford, supra note 10, at 2689 ("If the primary
function of the group is to be advisory to the attending physician, apologies should not
be needed for the physician's desire to have a free and uninhibited consultation.").
107. See Siegler, supra note 10, at 22.
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surrogate. Thus the committee is presented with a polarized choice
between physician and patient. That is not to say that committees
never take the patient's side; they sometimes do. It is merely to say
that the setup is guaranteed to activate whatever ambivalence or
hostility committee members feel toward patients' rights and
authority.
So far I have found the roots of committees' double identity in
their history, as part of a revolution not yet completed. But there is
another part of the root system, connected yet distinct. It is the fact
that all of us, not just physicians, speak a kind of double discourse
about medical decisionmaking. On the one hand, in both ethics and
law we speak the language of rights, and emphasize autonomy and
self-determination. This is the language of reform. The attempted
transformation in medical relationships, the effort to shift power
from doctor to patient, has hinged on the recognition of legal and
moral rights belonging to the patient. "Patient autonomy" has been
the battle cry.'
At the same time there has been a whole different language
used to talk about clinical relationships-the language of caregiving.
This language emphasizes the connectedness of physician and pa-
tient; it eschews what is seen as the adversarial and isolating lan-
guage of rights. There is a long tradition behind this approach. It
has roots in the traditional physician paternalism that Katz traces
from Hippocratic sources and into this century.' 0 9 This ancient ap-
proach sees the physician as guardian of the patient's well-being as
108. Indeed, the emphasis on patient autonomy has been so great that there has been
a backlash. Some within the field of medical ethics have claimed that there has been an
over-emphasis leading to distortion in ethical analysis. See, e.g., Callahan, Autonomy: A
Moral Good, Not a Moral Obsession, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1984, at 42; Questioning
Autonomy in Health Care Decision Making, 9 ETHICAL CURRENTS 1 (Nov. 1986) (newsletter)
(on file at Maryland Law Review). Among physicians there has been a different sort of
negative reaction, less grounded in philosophy. Some physicians have rejected the idea
of patient decisional authority outright. Others have claimed that health care personnel
themselves have rights that may be violated if patients are given too much authority.
Such a claim was made in In reJobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987). In that case, an
entire health care institution refused to effectuate a family's decision on the patient's
behalf to terminate artificial nutrition and hydration. The institution asserted that it had
a policy against withdrawing artificial nutrition. The court nonetheless ruled that the
staff was obligated to respect the treatment refusal. Id. at 425-26, 529 A.2d at 450.
However, the court relied on the fact that the health care institution had given no notice
when the patient was first admitted that the staff would refuse to terminate this form of
life-sustaining treatment. Id. at 425, 529 A.2d at 450. The court thus left open the
possibility that if a patient or her surrogate were so notified upon admission, the staff
could successfully assert the claimed right.
109. SeeJ. KATz, supra note 46, at 1-29.
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understood by the physician, rather than seeing the physician as
bound to respect the patient's rights as asserted by the patient. The
emphasis is on physician beneficence rather than patient autonomy.
This tradition is actually premised on an assumption of deep con-
nectedness between doctor and patient. The physician is presumed
to know what is best for the patient, and without even discussing it
with her explicitly. "° The Hippocratic Oath actually admonishes
physicians to avoid revealing to the patient a diagnosis or prognosis,
and Katz points to the long history of physician silence that has fol-
lowed."' Even today we still see the suggestion that physicians are
so connected to their patients that they simply know what the pa-
tient wants, without the need for explicit conversation." 2 Indeed,
some people still argue that physicians ought to avoid discussing
troubling diagnoses or prognoses with their patients,'' 3 even
though polls commissioned by the President's Commission and
published in the early 1980s showed that people want to hear the
truth, even if it is dire." 4
One of the great contributions of Katz's work in The Silent World
of Doctor and Patient is to expose the assumption of doctor/patient
connectedness in traditional physician paternalism:
[P]hysicians have tried to justify their preference for trust
in silence rather than in conversation on [a] dangerous be-
lief: that physicians and patients have an identity of inter-
est in medical matters. In this view no conflict exists
between them; one can decide for the other ....
The belief that doctors can act on behalf of patients
denies the existence of inevitable conflict. Physicians' and
patients' separate identities become obliterated. They coi-
l 10. See id. at 2 & passim.
111. See id. at 4-7 & passim.
112. In the realm of decisionmaking about "do not resuscitate" orders, a ground-
breaking study, much cited ever since, demonstrated that physicians were unlikely to talk
to their patients about resuscitation, yet frequently formed opinions anyway about the
patient's resuscitative preferences. The study went on to show that physicians were
wrong in their intuition of the patient's preference a substantial amount of the time. See
Bedell & Delbanco, Choices About Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation in the Hospital: When Do
Physicians Talk with Patients?, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1089 (1984).
113. See, e.g., Cantwell, Final Plans, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1987, at A34, col. 1
("[D]ealing with a death sentence is another matter. Some people prefer not to hear
from others what they have already told themselves.").
114. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE




lapse into one identity and one single authoritative voice
emerges-the physician's. 15
Thus the ancient tradition of physician paternalism that the patients'
rights movement of the mid-20th century endeavored to overthrow
was grounded in an assumption of profound connection between
doctor and patient. Indeed, contemporary critics of the patients'
rights movement have accused it of destroying the doctor/patient
relationship, turning the doctor and patient into adversaries." 6
The patient is depicted as a stranded and lonely decisionmaker, de-
prived of the physician's wisdom and protection." 17
Just as the revolution in the doctor/patient relationship remains
incomplete, so the two types of discourse about that relationship
continue-the rights-based one emphasizing patient autonomy, and
the paternalism-based one emphasizing physician beneficence and
connectedness to the patient. They are separate strands that weave
their way through the literature in a tangled fashion. There is, for
example, a literature investigating the process of medical decision-
making and what allocation of decisionmaking roles patients
want.' i This literature is a product of the patients' rights move-
ment, insofar as it is asking patients the fundamental question of
who should decide what in the medical interaction. Yet all too often
articles end up retreating from the full implication of patients' rights
by talking about whether there should be patient "involvement" or
"participation" in the treatment decision, not whether the patient
should control the treatment decision by having the final say.' 'In-
115. J. KATz, supra note 46, at 98-100.
116. See, e.g., Ladd, Legalism and Medical Ethics, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOMEDI-
CAL ETHICS 1, 18-19, 29 (. Davis, B. Hoffmaster, S. Shorten eds. 1978); Robertson, The
Rights of Doctors, BIOETHIcs NORTHWEST, Spring 1976, at 6; Thomasma, Beyond Medical
Paternalism and Patient Autonomy: A Model of Physician Conscience for the Physician-Patient Rela-
tionship, 98 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 243, 245 (1983).
117. See, e.g., Callahan, supra note 108, at 41; Burt, The Limits of Law in Regulating Health
Care Decisions, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1977, at 29, 32.
118. See, e.g., Strull, Lo & Charles, Do Patients Want to Participate in Medical Decision Mak-
ing?, 252J. A.M.A. 2990 (1984); M. Haug & B. Lavin, CONSUMERISM IN MEDICINE: CHAL-
LENGING PHYSICIAN AUTHORITY (1983); cf. Smedira, Evans, Grais, Cohen, Lo, Cooke,
Schecter, Fink, Epstein-Jaffe, May & Luce, Withholding and Withdrawal of Life-Support from
the Critically Il, 322 NEw. ENG. J. MED. 309, 312 (1990) (asking families).
119. See, e.g., Angell, Respecting the Autonomy of Competent Patients, 310 NEW ENG.J. MED.
1115, 1116 (1984) ("Without information [the patient] cannot participate in decisions."
(emphasis added)); Farber, Bowman, Major & Greene, Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation
(CPR): Patient Factors and Decision Making, 144 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2229, 2229
(1984) ("Although most physicians would agree that patients or their families should be
involved in the decision .... the real potential for their contribution is questionable."
(emphasis added)).
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volvement or participation in a decision is, after all, not the same
thing as control over the decisional outcome.
"Rights" and "autonomy" talk thus exists side by side with a
kind of caregiving talk that emphasizes beneficence and doc-
tor/patient connectedness. The tension between a rights-oriented
perspective and one grounded in human connection and interde-
pendency pervades many literatures and fields of endeavor today. 120
Thus, it should come as no surprise that the way we talk and think
about ethics committees reveals the same tension. On the one
hand, they are presented as patient-protective rights enforcers; on
the other hand, as groups serving clinicians by offering consultation
and support. To date, these warring perspectives are completely in-
tertwined with one another. Few people have carefully separated
them.
The result is that ethics committees are mired in a confusion
and double-speak that endangers patients. Committees claim to
serve patients and protect their rights, but pursue processes that in
fact serve caregivers, affording patients no rights at all.
III. WHERE To FROM HERE-THE ROLE OF DUE PROCESS
Ethics committees are a due process wasteland. There is no in-
dication that committees regularly offer patients any of the basic
procedural protections such as notice, an opportunity to be heard, a
chance to confront those in opposition, receipt of a written determi-
nation and a statement of reasons, and an opportunity to challenge
that determination. Ethics committees may seek the decisive power
of the Adjudicatory Model, while using the processes of the Consul-
tation Model. This is the worst of both worlds-the committee
wields great influence over the treatment decision but accords no
protections for the patient's rights.
This Part argues that committees must protect patients' rights
and so must accord due process. Committees should indeed be
merely advisory-legally and ethically, the patient possesses the
binding decisional authority, and there is no basis for committee
pre-emption of this prerogative. Committees should nonetheless
offer procedural protections because of their potential influence and
full range of obligations. Without giving the patient notice and an
opportunity to be heard, the committee is merely talking rights
without granting any. Section A argues that this is unacceptable.
120. Feminist writers in particular are struggling actively with this tension. See gener-
ally C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); N. NODDINGS, CARING (1984).
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Ethics committees have legal, ethical, and what I call "transforma-
tive" obligations to protect patients' rights. For too long we have
permitted committees to serve only caregivers, and allowed ambiva-
lence to reign about true recognition for patients' rights. That has
to change. Committees must accord due process when consulting
on current cases.
Section B spells out what process is due. It begins with an anal-
ysis of the procedural requirements imposed by the Maryland law,
the one existing statute dictating how committees should oper-
ate. 12 I argue that although the statute is a step in the right direc-
tion, more process is necessary to guarantee full patient
participation.
Finally, the last section argues that a committee embracing due
process is performing a vital mission within the hospital. By provid-
ing due process protections in its own proceedings, the committee
moves caregivers from a history of dominance and ambivalence
about patients' rights, toward an era in which patients' rights be-
come a reality. Due process is not a tool to defeat caregiving.
Caregivers and their concerns will remain in the committee room
inescapably. But the patient will be in the room as well, and protec-
tion of her rights will be the committee's priority. Thus due process
becomes a tool for protecting patients' rights in the context of
caregiving. By according due process in its own proceedings, and
by championing a form of due process more broadly within the
health care institution, the committee can fulfill the progressive mis-
sion of nesting rights in a community of care.
A. The Necessity of Due Process
For too long we have tolerated the muddle described in previ-
ous sections: the persistence of a false mythology lulling many into
believing that an ethics committee could advise on a current case
without assuring patient involvement in the proceedings. Ethics
committees could simply pursue the Consultation Model, serving
the needs of health care professionals, and according the patient no
notice, opportunity to be heard, and other means of participation.
Yet while the false mythology and the use of a Consultation
Model have quieted due process concerns, 122 in fact committees
121. See infra note 155.
122. As a 1975 student Note remarked, "There has been almost no discussion of due
process in the medical area." Note, Due Process in the Allocation of Scarce Lifesaving Medical
Resources, 84 YALE L.J. 1734, 1734 n.4 (1975). That state of affairs has hardly changed
since.
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have become increasingly entrenched, exercising greater and
greater power over the fate of real patients. As I have detailed
above, committees and their proponents have sought to amass sub-
stantial power for ethics committees. The literature shows commit-
tees claiming the power to make treatment decisions, shows ethics
committee proponents judging a committee's maturity and success
by its degree of influence over those treatment decisions, and shows
the proponents even urging that courts defer to ethics committee
determinations. Ethics committees may have rested on the Consul-
tation Model in assuring themselves that no particular process was
due, but they have sought the power and influence of the Adjudica-
tory Model.
Even when an ethics committee does not deliberately seek to
wield great influence over the outcome of treatment disputes, others
may give the committee that sort of influence. As suggested above,
patients, surrogates, and caregivers may simply give the committee's
conclusion determinative weight. In any case, the patient or surro-
gate may not be able to pursue the matter in court. Finally, the
court may give committee conclusions great weight, whether the
committee wants that or not.
All of this should suggest that dismissing due process as irrele-
vant simply because the committee declares itself to be advising
rather than determining the outcome of treatment disputes is
wrong-headed. It is wrong because, as elaborated above, there is no
simple dichotomy, but a range of influence the committee may exer-
cise. It is also wrong because the committee may decide to be sim-
ply advisory, but in fact wield determinative power.
Because of the actual influence ethics committees can exert
over the patient's fate-indeed, her life and death-committees
must accord procedural due process to the patient whenever the
committee consults on an ongoing case. I analyze below the legal,
ethical, and "transformative" roots of this due process obligation.
But it is important to clarify here exactly what committee activities
require due process.23
The due process obligation should attach whenever an ethics
123. John Fletcher agrees that ethics committees should accord due process. See
Fletcher, The Bioethics Movement and Hospital Ethics Committees, 50 MD. L. REV. 859, 860
(1991). Yet he maintains that the committee can serve the doctor at one minute, and the
patient at another. See id. at 860-61. However, I reject that contention. Fletcher also
advocates establishing an "institutional ethics program." See id. at 860. He argues that
what I seek can be obtained within that framework. See id. Yet, Fletcher's proposal to
create "programs," by itself, does not solve the due process problem that concerns me.
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committee becomes involved in an ongoing clinical case in a way
that has the potential to exert significant influence over treatment
decisions. This is a very broad standard. It means that it is almost
never appropriate for a committee to serve as private consultant to
the health care professional in a case.' 24 Indeed, there should be a
presumption in favor of the committee according due process when-
ever it is consulted in an ongoing case.'2 5
There will be many hostile to this suggestion, who believe that
caregivers should have access to an ethics committee without patient
involvement.' 26 As noted above, there are those who have argued
that the primary mission of ethics committees-or at least an impor-
tant part of their mission-is to serve medical personnel. I reject
that squarely. Because of the actual power that ethics committees
can wield, their primary mission must be patient protection rather
than service to health care professionals. Serving the needs of
health care professionals cannot be the dominant mission for com-
mittees performing dispute resolution in ongoing cases. Because
these committees actually exercise power in disputes over what will
124. I say "almost never" because it does seem conceivable that there is a narrow
category of questions a clinician could ask of an ethics committee without triggering the
need for committee due process. For example, if the clinician wanted to use the com-
mittee as a sounding board in order to make sure that she had collected all medical and
nonmedical information needed to work with a patient toward a treatment decision, or
to make sure that the roster of information she was presenting to the patient was com-
plete, that might not trigger the due process requirement. The exception to the due
process obligation would be based on the fact that the committee would be advising the
clinician on how to participate adequately in the initial decisionmaking process. If the
primary decisional process between doctor and patient then erupts in dispute, or foun-
ders on some ethically controversial point, committee involvement will require patient
participation and due process protections.
125. Fletcher discusses the fact that ethics committee case consultation is sometimes
conducted not by the plenary committee, but by a sub-group, a single designated indi-
vidual, or a group of individuals whom the committee asks to intervene. See Fletcher,
supra note 123, at 878. Whenever anyone acts on the ethics committee's behalf in con-
sulting on an ongoing case, the potential exists for decisively influencing the treatment
outcome, for inspiring judicial deference, and for offering what is in effect the forum of
last resort. Thus, due process obligations would still obtain. However, precisely what
procedural protections those obligations would require may vary depending on exactly
what group or individual performs the consultation and whether the patient can subse-
quently trigger plenary committee review. Spelling out all of the possible variations is
beyond the scope of this article. The point is that the committee as a whole has a re-
sponsibility to ensure that whatever mechanism it uses fulfills the committee's responsi-
bility to accord due process.
126. Fletcher suggests that many physicians will prefer "traditional" consultation to
meeting with a full committee. See Fletcher, supra note 123, at 879. This is undoubtedly
true. But I am arguing that it is the job of the ethics committee to break down physician
resistance to involving patients directly in the process of resolving treatment disputes.
See infra pp. 853-54.
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happen to individual patients, the committees cannot properly take
as their mission simply supporting the physician or other profes-
sional. To adopt that mission would turn these committees into a
kind of kangaroo court, a mechanism for backing the powerful par-
ties-the health care professionals. Even though the committee
might occasionally admonish an individual professional, its ultimate
goal would be to support that camp.
This is an unacceptable use of ethics committees. When a com-
mittee becomes involved in an ongoing case, the person whose fate
is on the line is not the physician, but the patient. It is the patient
whose body, whose life and death, whose entire well-being is at is-
sue. Moreover, it is the patient not the physician whose basic legal
and moral rights are at stake. In the common case, for example, in
which the patient seeks to refuse life-sustaining treatment, the pa-
tient may be asserting a constitutionally protected liberty interest,
other constitutional rights, and a common-law right to be free of
unwanted bodily invasion. Moreover, in ethical terms the patient
will be asserting fundamental rights of autonomy and self-
determination.
Rarely, if ever, will the health care professional be asserting any
right of similar magnitude. In any event, there is tremendous agree-
ment both in law and ethics that patients' rights and interests should
govern treatment decisions. Thus, treatment must be evaluated by
asking whether it serves the patient's interests, and the patient is the
one who has the final say. Consequently, if an ethics committee in-
volving itself in a treatment dispute is to act in keeping with the
prevailing legal and ethical consensus, the committee must regard
patients' rights and interests as its primary concern.
One might agree with this proposition, and nonetheless fail to
impose due process obligations on committees. As noted above,
Ruth Macklin maintains that the committee, though faced with a
host of caregiver and institutional concerns, must give the patient's
rights and welfare precedence.' 27 Yet she suggests that committees
may nonetheless act as consultants to caregivers.128 In other words,
committees can champion the rights and welfare of patients without
having the patient in the room. Nor is Macklin alone. Others main-
tain that the committee's process need not afford patients full par-
ticipation or even notice-so long as the committee's conclusion is
127. See Macklin, supra note 55, at 158.
128. See id. at 159-62.
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advisory rather than binding.1 9 Thus I must show that even when
the committee's determination is advisory, the committee must ac-
cord due process to fulfill its mission of protecting patients' rights.
A number of commentators have conceded that were the com-
mittee's determination to be binding, the committee would be obli-
gated to ensure patient participation and provide procedural
protections.13 0 Yet I join with the majority of authorities who have
maintained that committees should render only advisory determina-
tions. After all, it is the patient who possesses binding decisional
authority, as long as she has decisionmaking capacity; if she lacks
capacity, a surrogate exercises decisional authority for her. There is
no basis in law or ethics for committee pre-emption of the patient or
surrogate.
It may seem odd, then, that I would relegate the committee to
rendering non-binding decisions and yet demand due process. Yet
as I have argued, even a committee whose determination is formally
non-binding may in fact exercise tremendous power. Furthermore,
it may serve as the forum of last resort, even if technically the court-
house door remains open. I argue that these facts of life mandate
that committees accord due process in order to fulfill the full range
of their obligations.
The obligation to accord due process, I suggest, springs from
three different roots-from law, ethics, and the historic role of com-
mittees in transforming medical relationships so as to empower pa-
tients. It may seem unusual at first blush to suggest roots outside
the law for process obligations. After all, "due process" is a phrase
that comes to us from constitutional law. I do indeed argue that in
some health care settings and some situations, committees labor
under a legal obligation to accord due process. However, the argu-
ment below is more far-reaching than that. Even when the law
would not strictly impose these process obligations, committees
have an ethical obligation to accord due process because of the
power they may exercise over the resolution of treatment disputes.
There is no way to exercise power over treatment decisions so as to
fulfill the mission of giving patients' interests and rights priority,
without allowing the patient to articulate her interests and safeguard
her rights. Finally, I suggest that the obligation to accord due pro-
cess is also grounded in the historical transformation of which ethics
committees are a part. An ethics committee cannot empower pa-
129. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 72.
130. See supra pp. 817-18; supra notes 74-76.
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tients and give them a voice, while excluding them from the commit-
tee's process and rendering them silent.
1. Legal Groundsfor Due Process.-In treatment disputes coming
before committees, patients will often have constitutionally pro-
tected rights at stake. Many cases that come before these commit-
tees concern the so-called "right to die," and the Supreme Court
recently made it clear in Cruzan that these cases involve constitution-
ally protected rights.'' In addition, some state courts in deciding
termination of treatment cases have found relevant protections in
their state constitutions. 3 2 Moreover, some of the disputes that
come before ethics committees may involve constitutionally pro-
tected rights other than the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment,
such as the right to refuse psychotropic medication' 33 or abortion
rights. ' 3 4
Because the constitutional mandate of due process applies to
state action,' 5 committees in public health care institutions dealing
with rights protected by the Constitution will labor under this re-
quirement. It will also apply in whatever additional circumstances
support a finding of state action. But the mandate to provide due
process should apply more broadly. Committees within private in-
stitutions may find their determinations accorded judicial deference
in subsequent litigation, as indicated above.' 6 The court may for-
mally acknowledge that deference in its opinion, or may never ac-
knowledge it at all. Thus the committee may, in effect, exercise
substantial influence over the judicial resolution of litigated cases.
If judges are free to defer to the ethics committee's conclusions,
then committees should be obligated to ensure full patient partici-
pation in the committee process. Otherwise, the wrong the commit-
tee does in excluding the patient is compounded by the court's
subsequent reliance on the committee's judgment. Although the
patient presumably will have the opportunity in court to challenge
the committee's judgment, any judicial tendency to defer to the eth-
131. See supra note 23.
132. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987) (basing the
right to refuse treatment on both federal and state constitutions, as well as the common
law); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990) (same).
133. See generally Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990).
134. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
135. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part, "No state shall... deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
136. See Wolf, supra note 16, at 13-14.
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ics committee's conclusions may make that challenge a difficult up-
hill battle.
Finally, any proposal that ethics committee proceedings substi-
tute for judicial review must require that committees accord due
process. There have been many such proposals. I 7 Indeed, Alan
Meisel has written that "The primary judicial (and regulatory) impe-
tus for ethics committees has been to substitute for judicial review
of decisions about life-sustaining treatment, or some components of
the decision making process . .".1."38 Most authorities do not
recommend that an ethics committee determination formally pre-
clude judicial review. Nonetheless, they do suggest that more cases
be resolved by the committees, without subsequent judicial review.
As suggested above, many patients and families lack the wherewithal
to take their case to court in any event. Thus, whether by design or
due to lack of patient resources, the ethics committee will often
serve as the forum of last resort. This too imposes on committees
due process obligations. Judges, other authorities, and ethics com-
mittees themselves, cannot seek to substitute the committee's
processes for judicial ones and then tolerate a committee process
that precludes patient participation.' 39
I do not mean to suggest that ethics committee review should
actually be permitted to preclude judicial review. The courthouse
door must remain open. Ethics committees engage primarily in eth-
ical analysis, not the enforcement of legal rights. Nothing in the
history or design of ethics committees would equip them to serve as
the ultimate guardian of those rights. An ethics committee may not
even include a lawyer. Moreover, these committees are predomi-
nantly staffed by employees of the health care institution, and so
cannot provide the independent review of a court. Even if several
health care institutions within a community were to create a joint
committee, it would probably be dominated by health care profes-
sionals employed at the cooperating institutions. Thus the court
must always remain available. Yet those who advocate using com-
137. See, e.g., A. MEISEL, THE RIGHT To DIE 474-75 (1989) (as quoted in text infra); Lo,
supra note 10, at 46 ("Ethics committees may offer an attractive alternative to the
courts. ... The judicial system may be too slow for clinical decisions.").
138. A. MEISEL, supra note 137, at 474-75 (footnote omitted).
139. Cf. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT,
supra note 4, at 168 ("[lhf a major advantage of institutional ethics committees is that
they will provide an alternative to court review in most cases, careful attention must be
paid to the acceptability of the committees within existing legal structures."); Lo, supra
note 10, at 47 ("[For ethics committees to be accepted as a quicker and less acrimoni-
ous alternative to the courts, they must be perceived to be as fair as the courts.").
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mittees instead of courts simply show once again that there is pres-
sure from many sources to use ethics committees as the decisive
forum. This means that patients cannot be excluded. As the fre-
quent, and often intended forum of last resort, committees must ac-
cord due process.
2. Ethical Grounds for Due Process.-Committees should also rec-
ognize an ethical obligation to accord due process. That ethical ob-
ligation is grounded, first of all, in the fact that a patient involved in
a treatment dispute has fundamental moral rights at stake. The dis-
pute may take one of several forms, and the precise rights at stake
will vary depending on what is in dispute. But usually the patient's
right to autonomy or self-determination will be at issue.' 40 For ex-
ample, if the competent patient and her physician are in disagree-
ment about the proper treatment course, then the patient's
autonomy is certainly at stake. Her right to govern her own body, to
exert the authority of a self-governing competent adult, and to meet
death as she chooses (in the case, for example, of a patient refusing
life-sustaining treatment) are all on the line. If, however, the dis-
pute is about whether she is competent to decide, then her authority
to exercise rights on her behalf is at stake. Again the patient's au-
tonomy is in jeopardy, but in a different way.' 4 '
The correlate of the patient's right to self-determination is
others' obligation to respect her autonomous choices. As
Beauchamp and Childress have carefully explained, this requires
not only an attitude of respect, but also a certain kind of action.
To respect an autonomous agent is, first, to recognize that
140. For an influential explication of autonomy in biomedical ethics, see T.
BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 67-119 (3d ed. 1989).
141. The argument is more complex in the case of a patient who lacks decisional ca-
pacity. If that patient while formerly competent left treatment instructions (for example,
in a living will or another form of advance directive), then most commentators would
agree that those instructions represent an exercise of patient autonomy or self-determi-
nation. The more difficult case is the patient who failed to leave instructions or who has
never been competent. In those cases, the courts, beginning with Quinlan, have none-
theless reasoned that incompetent patients are rights-bearers whose rights must be exer-
cised by a surrogate. See, e.g., Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664. Yet some
commentators have challenged this, arguing that it makes no sense to talk about an
incompetent patient's fight of self-determination when that person never exercised the
right while previously competent. See, e.g., Rhoden, supra note 25, at 385-88. For the
purposes of my argument in text that ethics committees have ethical obligations to en-
sure patient or surrogate participation, one can reject the rights analysis for this cate-
gory of patients (even though the courts have embraced it), and nonetheless find a
committee obligation based on the ethical duty to protect patient welfare and prevent
harm.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
person's capacities and perspectives, including his or her
right to hold views, to make choices, and to take actions
based on personal values and beliefs. But respect involves
more than taking an attitude. It involves treating agents so
as to allow or enable them to act autonomously.' 4*
The duty of respect for persons, here articulated as a duty of respect
for autonomous agents, 4 3 is at the core of modem biomedical eth-
ics. That is because the value of self-determination or autonomy is
either the central value or one of the central values in theories of
medical ethics, depending on which theory you use.' 44
Most theories of medical ethics embrace autonomy in the usual
sense of self-governance given it by the tradition of liberal individu-
alism. However, I do not mean to use the concept of autonomy un-
critically here. Others have criticized the liberal formulation of
autonomy for resting on the fiction of isolated selves whose bounda-
ries must be preserved in order to keep others out and so remain
self-governing. 14  Of course, this version of autonomy has almost
no relevance to ill patients in a medical setting. Such people are
quite dependent on others, including their medical caregivers, for
support, advice, and health care, among other things. Moreover,
patients are dependent on caregivers to create the circumstances
under which a patient can even make a decision about treatment.
Caregivers must supply information, interpretation, and support for
the patient's exercise of authority. Indeed, the patient may not even
know she has decisional authority until the caregiver tells her. Thus,
autonomy in a health care setting requires support from the caregiv-
ing context.
How does all of this relate to ethics committees? First, ethics
committees are supposed to understand, apply, and advocate ethical
principles within their health care institutions. As Robert Veatch ar-
gues, an ethics committee "must have in place, and must con-
sciously orient to a set of general ethical principles that will guide its
actions and shape its decision making."' 46 Yet any plausible set of
ethical principles in medicine, at least in the second half of the 20th
142. T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 140, at 71.
143. See THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BI-
OMEDICAL AND BEHAVIOR RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE,
THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (1978).
144. See A. BUCHANAN & D. BROCK, supra note 25, at 41-47.
145. See, e.g., Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE
J.L. FEMINISM 7, 10 (1989).
146. See Veatch, supra note 105, at 37.
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century, will centrally include the principle of respect for persons
and value of patient autonomy. Thus an ethics committee will have
to embrace the principle of respect for persons and the committee
will have to accord such respect in its own actions.
There is a second source as well for the committee's obligation
to accord respect for persons. It is the fact that the committee is the
creature of a broader health care institution with institutional obli-
gations toward its patients.' 47 Those obligations must include the
fundamental obligation of respect for persons. An institution that
tramples on its patients, according their exercise of self-determina-
tion no respect, cannot be rendering good patient care. Moreover,
there is an institutional responsibility to ensure that individual clini-
cians practice in a way that fulfills their individual obligations to re-
spect patient self-determination. Thus the ethics committee as a
creature of the institution must accord respect to patient self-deter-
mination, and must act in a way that prompts the treating physician
and other professionals involved in the patient's case to accord that
same respect.
Finally, health care professionals on the ethics committee will
have their own individual obligations to show this same respect to-
ward the patient. They do not cast off their professional obligations
at the door to the committee room. Moreover, health care profes-
sionals have this obligation toward any patients with whom they
come into contact, not just those within their medical care. Thus a
physician is not free to do something to another physician's patient
that violates the patient's right of self-determination.
Thus on several grounds the ethics committee incurs ethical ob-
ligations, and those obligations include maintaining, demonstrating,
and promoting respect for patients and their self-determination.
This is an ethical ground for a duty of due process. The committee
cannot show respect for the patient and her self-determination if the
committee reaches a judgment about a dispute over her treatment
with no notice to her and no chance for her to participate. Indeed,
such action would show disrespect for her. It would substantively
erode her right of self-determination. The committee failing to ac-
cord due process would set itself up as a separate decisionmaker
rather than respecting the patient's role as the key decisionmaker.
Finally, according no due process would demonstrate to the treating
147. Cf Merritt, supra note 10, at 1272 ("Ethics committees may have... -as a part
of the hospital structure-at least an indirect relationship with the patient and a duty to
serve the patient's interests.").
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clinicians that the patient need not be present, much less be heard,
while the proper treatment course is being decided. This would un-
dermine the commitment of those clinicians to show respect for the
patient's self-determination in their own treatment of her.
There are additional ethical grounds for a duty of due process.
They need not detain us at such length because again they derive
from the fact that the ethics committee is a creature of the broader
health care institution, is composed at least in part of health care
professionals, and directly affects both the individual patient and
her treating clinicians. Thus an ethics committee, being a creature
of the health care institution and comprised of health care profes-
sionals, incurs the institution's and professionals' obligations of be-
neficence and non-maleficence.' 48 In other words, the committee
must act to promote the well-being of patients and avoid harm to
them. To exclude the patient from the process of determining her
care, and to consider overriding the patient without listening to her,
is certainly to harm the patient's interests.
Finally, the committee has an obligation to accord due process
grounded in its duty to act fairly and in accordance with values of
procedural justice. I have noted earlier that the value of procedural
justice has gone under-appreciated in formal statements of the val-
ues underlying ethical medical care.' 49 In part this is probably be-
cause medical ethics as a discipline grew up examining the dyadic
relationship of doctor and patient, rather than how groups of pro-
fessionals, committees, and even whole institutions should function.
In the dyadic relationship of doctor and patient, procedural justice
has less of a role than in the functioning of those groups. Yet as
attention now turns to the ethical obligations of these groups, the
dictates of procedural justice should receive more attention as well.
Here the legal literature can provide useful analogies and analysis,
since the values underlying procedure and the nature of procedural
justice have received such extensive treatment there.' 50 In the
bioethics literature there are at least the beginnings of attention to
problems of procedural justice."' One needs no elaborate theory
of procedural justice to recognize that there is some fundamental
duty of fairness. Because ethics committees deal with patients and
their basic moral rights, it would seem that committees have a duty
to develop a procedure that ensures the committee will do so fairly.
148. See, e.g., T. BEAUCHAMP &J. CHILDRESS, supra note 140, at 120-255.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 56-63.
150. See, e.g., R. COVER & 0. Fiss, THE STUCTURE OF PROCEDURE (1979).
151. See, e.g., T. BEAUCHAMP &J. CHILDRESS, supra note 140, at 169-70.
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This would suggest that a committee must deal with the rights and
interests of patients seriously and deliberately. It is hard to imagine
a principle of fairness and procedural justice that would permit a
committee to become involved and exercise power in a treatment
dispute without hearing from the patient herself. Moreover, a duty
of procedural justice would suggest that a committee has an obliga-
tion to formulate rules, a set of regular procedures to be followed.
Otherwise, there will be no guarantee of serious, deliberate, and fair
consideration in an individual case. There also will be no assurance
that cases will be treated comparably, in other words no assurance
of fairness across cases as well as within a single case. Thus obliga-
tions of procedural justice also suggest that committees have a duty
to accord due process both in handling the individual case and in
formulating rules to govern procedure in the various cases that
come before the committee.
3. Transformative Grounds for Due Process.-I have so far argued
that the committee has legal and ethical obligations both to the indi-
vidual patient and to the group of patients whose cases come before
the committee, and that these obligations ground a duty to accord
due process. But there is one other basis for that duty-the commit-
tee's transformative obligations not only to the individual patient
and the group whose cases come to the committee, but also to the
entire category of patients, present and future. Ethics committees
have been embraced as part of a whole movement whose major am-
bition is the recognition of patients' rights, as I have described
above. They have proliferated as part of a larger effort to transform
doctor/patient relationships, shifting the locus of power from doc-
tor to patient. True, ambivalence has set in, so that many commit-
tees now talk patients' rights while affirming physician authority.
But committees were nonetheless embraced because of their trans-
formative potential-committees could bring the modern medical
ethics movement into the clinic, and help give birth to patients'
rights.
The fact that ethics committees spring from this transformative
vision, and do in fact have transformative potential, is itself another
basis for committee due process obligations. Committees were a re-
sponse to the realization that patients were a subordinated and op-
pressed group-those with the most at stake had the least power.
Committees thus have an obligation to help alleviate the traditional
subordination and oppression of patients, and instead to assist in
the ongoing effort to empower patients. A committee that ignores
patients. and excludes them from its process is turning its back on
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this obligation. It is reinforcing the traditional exclusion of patients
from the process of determining their treatment, and is thwarting
the empowerment of patients.
Committees have a transformative mission in one other sense as
well. They can and should make the abstract ethical concept of au-
tonomy a functioning reality in the health care setting. As noted
above, the traditional idea of autonomy as exclusion of others in
order to achieve self-governance has almost no applicability in med-
ical settings.'-" Instead, we need a notion of autonomy that pre-
serves the value of self-determination but recognizes that this is self-
determination in the context of dependency. Jennifer Nedelsky has
recently written about the need to reconceive autonomy generally
along these lines.' 5 ' She has also recognized the great role proce-
dural due process can play in accomplishing this. Ethics committee
experimentation with due process is the way to rebuild from the
ground up a notion of autonomy that genuinely preserves patient
self-determination, while recognizing the patient's dependence on
caregiving.
B. What Kind of Process is Due?
Ethics committees thus have due process obligations grounded
in law, ethics, and the committees' transformative mission. It is
heartening, then, to see the one state that requires ethics commit-
tees take due process seriously.' 54 The Maryland statute requiring
ethics committees mandates notice, the right to be heard, and the
right to receive an explanation of the committee's determination.15 5
While I will argue that this is not enough, it is important to under-
stand what a step forward these Maryland process mandates are.
The American Medical Association's and American Hospital Associ-
ation's guidelines on ethics committees suggest hardly any proce-
dural protections at all.' 56 Moreover, it certainly seems that left to
their own devices, ethics committees do not create process
protections. 157
To date, the Maryland statute is the major legislative effort to
152. See supra p. 840.
153. See Nedelsky, supra note 145.
154. See MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 19-370 to -374 (1990 & Supp. 1990).
155. See id. § 19-374(b).
156. See AMA Guidelines, supra note 10; AHA Guidelines, supra note 10.
157. See infra text accompanying notes 56-63; A National Survey, supra note 24, at 904
(in the early 1980s, only 19% of ethics committees would allow patients to attend their
meetings).
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spell out good process for ethics committees.15 8 Thus the Maryland
statute is the key precedent for developing due process rules for
ethics committees, and its process provisions deserve enumeration.
This is rapidly done, however, because even in this ground-breaking
statute, the process provisions are not numerous.
The most detailed process provisions in the statute concern the
committee's process when it is advising on treatment options for
patients with life-threatening conditions. In such cases the commit-
tee is obligated to notify the patient of her right to trigger the com-
mittee process as "petitioner,"'' 5 9 to meet with the committee, t1 °
and "[t]o receive an explanation of the ... committee's advice."'16 1
In addition, there are others who must be notified that they hold the
same rights: the patient's immediate family, her guardians, and any-
one with power of attorney to make medical decisions for her.' 62 It
is not entirely clear from the wording of the statute whether one
retains the rights to meet with the committee and receive an expla-
nation even when someone else, such as the physician, acts as peti-
tioner and triggers the committee process. However, we can
construe the statute to be generous in its creation of rights, and as-
sume that as long as someone triggers the committee process, the
relevant patient, her family, guardians, and appointed proxy all have
the rights. Finally, the statute also suggests that the committee must
render its advice in writing, by stating that the "advice . . . shall
158. In addition to the Maryland statute, there has been one other significant govern-
mental effort to describe good ethics committee process. However, this effort was aimed
at a very specific kind of ethics committee-those operating within the "Baby Doe" stat-
utory and regulatory framework created by the federal government in an attempt to
encourage states to limit non-treatment decisions for imperiled newborns. The Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services promulgated optional guidelines for "Infant Care
Review Committees." See HHS Model Guidelines, supra note 13. The HHS guidelines
do contain some procedural protections. First, the infant care review committee is sup-
posed to take steps to see that the families of these infant patients know of the commit-
tee's existence, function, and availability. See § III. B. 1. Second, the patient's parent or
guardian is among those who can request an emergency committee meeting. See § VI.
A. 2. And finally, such meetings are supposed to "be open to the affected parties." See
§ VI. A. 4. However, less clear is the extent to which the full participation of the parents
or guardian is guaranteed. Although the guidelines recommend an advocate for the
infant, this is not an independent advocate but rather someone the committee chair
appoints from among the committee's members. See § VI. A. 5. The guidelines also
leave unclear the extent to which the family is entitled to an explanation of the commit-
tee's conclusions.
159. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 19-374(b)(1)(i) (1990 & Supp. 1990).
160. Id. § 19-374(b)(1)(ii).
161. Id. § 19-374(b)(1)(iii).
162. Id. § 19-374(b)(1).
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become part of the patient's medical record."'"6
A separate section covers process generally, presumably when
the question is not treatment options for a patient with a life-threat-
ening condition. t 64 Here the procedural protections are more lim-
ited. There is no mandated notice to the patient and the others.
Nor is there a right to receive an explanation of the committee's
advice. The statute only addresses the question of whether the pa-
tient and her family can meet with the committee.' 65 The statute
says that "the advisory committee, in appropriate cases, shall con-
sult" them. 1 66 It does not clarify, however, what "in appropriate
cases" means. This suggests that it is up to the committee itself to
determine what constitutes an "appropriate" case. Thus the com-
mittee might decide not to consult with the patient or family at all.
This section does provide one safeguard with greater bite: the per-
son triggering the committee process, who may be the patient, is
entitled to "be accompanied by any persons the petitioner
desires."' 16 7 Presumably this means the patient, if she is the peti-
tioner, could bring her lawyer and anyone else.
There is one other relevant provision. Indirect protection is
perhaps offered by the requirement that the health care institution
"establish ... [a] written procedure by which the ...committee
shall be convened."' 68 It is not clear from the wording whether this
document is supposed to specify the committee's procedures for
case consultation. If so, however, such a document would at least
provide the protection of a written set of rules.
The Maryland statute thus presents some quirks and definite
gaps when it comes to providing procedural protections for the pa-
tient. First, there is no reason to bifurcate the procedural rules, giv-
ing one set of protections to patients with life-threatening
conditions, and another to everyone else. All patients need both
sets of protections enumerated in the statute: the right to trigger
the proceedings, meet with the committee, and receive an explana-
tion of the committee's determination; notice to the patient that she
has those rights; plus the right to bring people with her when she
163. Id. § 19-374(d)(2).
164. See id. § 19-372.
165. See id. § 19-372(a)(3).
166. Id.
167. Id. § 19-372(b).
168. Id. § 19-371(2). However, the statutory language does not explicitly state
whether this document must specify the committee's procedures regarding case consul-
tation. An interpretation that it does would provide at least the protection of a written
set of rules.
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does trigger committee proceedings. However, the patient should
have these rights whether or not she triggers the proceedings by
acting as "petitioner." Whenever her case is being considered, she
should be entitled to meet with the committee, bringing anyone
with her, and be entitled as well to an explanation of the commit-
tee's determination.
Yet even this is not enough. Indeed, Paula Hollinger, the legis-
lator who sponsored the bill that eventuated in this statute, has ac-
knowledged that the statute leaves a great deal unspecified. In
responding to the question of whether there are "specific proce-
dures that these committees must follow when they review cases,"
she replied, "It]he protocol for each committee is left to the individ-
ual hospital."' 69
What protections are missing from this statute? One protection
that is a fundamental element of anything resembling due process is
notice to the patient and her representatives that the committee in-
tends to consider her case.' 70 Strikingly, the wisdom of according
even this very basic protection is debated in the literature.' 71 Yet
arguments against notice are untenable. Without notice, patients
and their representatives have no way of challenging, correcting,
participating in, or simply monitoring ethics committee considera-
tion of the patient's case. The ethics committee can then simply
shut the patient out of its process altogether. However, this would
violate the committee's legal, ethical, and transformative obliga-
tions, as enumerated above. Omitting the fundamental requirement
of notice is especially indefensible when one considers the great in-
fluence ethics committees often want and wield over treatment deci-
sions, up to and including actual decisionmaking power. 1
72
169. See Hollinger, Hospital Ethics Committees Required by Law in Maryland, HATNGS
CErER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 23, 24.
170. I do not address the question of whether the patient should have the right to
block ethics committee consideration of her case. However, there is a significant litera-
ture on this question. See, e.g., Veatch, supra note 105, at 36; Fost & Cranford, supra note
10, at 2689-90. The argument that the patient's approval should be required before the
committee may evaluate her case is based on concerns about the confidentiality of pa-
tient information, not due process concerns. See Veatch, supra note 105, at 36
("[C]onfidentiality is a right of the patient .... That means that committee members
should have no access to information about a patient's case without the patient's ap-
proval .... " (citation omitted)). I am quite sympathetic to this claim, but discussion of it
is beyond the scope of this article.
171. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 72, at 89; Lo, supra note 10, at 47.
172. This points up a basic flaw in John Robertson's argument that no notice is re-
quired when consulting the committee is optional rather than mandatory and following
the committee's recommendation is similarly optional rather than mandatory. See Rob-
ertson, supra note 72, at 89. The problem is that plenty of committees are set up that
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It is important to recognize that notice, however, must mean
more than simply notice to the patient that the committee intends to
take up her case. It must also mean that the patient is notified of the
procedures the committee will follow, and the procedural options
she can exercise. Without that, the patient will be at the commit-
tee's mercy, unable to anticipate what will happen, to participate ac-
tively, and to mount challenges. Finally, before a case ever gets to
this point, patients or their representatives should be routinely noti-
fied of the ethics committee's existence and functions. Absent such
notice, patients may well not even realize that such a forum exists.
Moving beyond notice, you get into more debatable territory.
There is, after all, no fixed content to due process; it depends on the
function being served. The legal concept of due process, the cases
tell us, hinges on "the probable value, if any, of... [the] procedural
safeguards" in preventing erroneous deprivation of the individual's
protected interest.' 73 This is only the legal root and formula for
due process. I have argued above that an ethics committee's due
process obligations have other roots as well, in its ethical and trans-
formative obligations.' 74 But it useful to start with a consideration
of what this legal formula recommends.
In an ethics committee's consideration of a case, this formula
suggests safeguards on the basis of whether they will help prevent
the committee from making a mistake in arriving at a conclusion.
There are indeed many opportunities for ethics committees to make
mistakes-in their understanding of the medical facts, facts about
way, but in reality exert substantial influence over the final treatment decision and, as I
have argued in the text, serve as the actual forum of last resort. The committee may be
designed to be what Robertson calls "optional/optional," and committee members may
bemuse themselves that they are merely giving optional advice, but the actual power and
effect of tl : committee may be much greater. Robertson makes two assumptions that I
reject. He assumes that the intended committee functioning is the same as the actual
committee functioning. Moreover, he assumes a simple dichotomy between committees
whose recommendations are optional and those whose recommendations are
mandatory, without recognizing that there is a spectrum. Cf. Ritchie, supra note 17, at 25
(arguing that there is a spectrum). A committee's recommendations need not be offi-
cially mandatory to exert a determinative influence over treatment decisions.
173. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). The legal formula derived from
Mathews v. Eldridge has been criticized for being excessively utilitarian and overly focused
on questions of technique, rather than attending to the values underlying due process.
See Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Ma-
thews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 28-30,
46-59 (1976). This suggests that a proper legal theory of due process would probably
incorporate some of the elements that I maintain are mandated by the committee's ethi-
cal due process obligations.
174. See supra pp. 839-44.
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the patient's position or that of her family or representatives, and
the relevant ethical principles. All three of these potential sources
of error counsel procedures that will ensure participation in the
committee's proceedings by the patient and her allies.
As to the first of these sources of error, the probability of the
committee making mistakes about the medical facts soars if there is
no one participating in the committee process with a stake in chal-
lenging the treating physician's presentation of those facts. Anyone
who has ever sat on an ethics committee knows that it can be quite
difficult to get to the bottom of the medical facts, but that sound
ethical analysis depends on it.' Yet it is only the patient or her
representative who has a direct stake in challenging the presentation
of facts by the treating clinician. This suggests that the patient
should be informed of what medical facts will be presented before
the committee convenes. She should be able to consult with other
health care personnel in an effort to understand those facts and pre-
pare to challenge them. She should also have full access to any
records on which those facts are based, typically her own medical
records. Finally, at the committee's meeting, she must be able to
contest the medical facts presented, asking other health care per-
sonnel of her choosing to offer different views. This would not re-
lieve the ethics committee of its own responsibility to investigate
and clarify the medical facts, particularly because not all patients will
elect to exercise the right. It would merely assure that the patient is
informed of the medical facts to be presented and is able to chal-
lenge them if she chooses.
In order to avert error of the second sort, error about the pa-
tient's views or those of her representatives, these people must be
able to present their views directly to the committee. Second-hand
reporting by the treating clinician involved in the dispute will not
do, though I suspect it is a rather common practice. 76 Nor should
second-hand reporting by any other health care professional, in-
cluding mental health professionals involved in the case, be deemed
sufficient. In any treatment dispute, the patient's views or those of
her surrogate are critical. There is no substitute for allowing the
disputants to speak for themselves.
Averting error of the third type is more difficult. The patient
175. Indeed, because proper evaluation of clinical data is difficult, yet critical to the
case review process, one commentator has suggested that only trained clinicians assist in
clinical ethical decisionmaking. See Siegler, supra note 10, at 24.
176. Cf. A National Survey, supra note 24, at 904 (reporting in the early 1980s that only
19% of ethics committees would allow patients to attend their meetings).
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cannot be expected to develop an expertise in medical ethics. In-
deed, ethics committees themselves often have trouble finding
someone who can instruct them and help develop their own ethics
expertise. Of course, that only makes it all the more important to
consider ways in which the patient can challenge the committee's
ethical conclusions. Two options present themselves. The first is
simply to make it clear to the patient that she can consult with any-
one she wishes, including anyone with an expertise in ethics, be they
an ethicist, a health care professional, a member of the clergy, or an
attorney. Moreover, the patient should be able to bring that person
with her to the committee's proceedings and have that person make
a presentation. The second way in which mistake may be averted is
more familiar. It is to require the committee to render its conclu-
sions in writing, together with a statement of reasons. Then the pa-
tient can review and evaluate the committee's reasoning. If she
wishes to challenge it, she should be able to do so. The committee
should be required to discuss with her and re-examine its
conclusions.
These suggested procedural protections are motivated so far by
the desire to avoid error, the linchpin of the legal due process
calculus, as noted above.177 Yet many of these protections do a
good deal more than simply reduce the chance of error. They also
help a committee fulfill its ethical obligations. The committee's ob-
ligation to act fairly mandates the patient's full participation in the
committee's proceedings, as well as an opportunity to challenge the
committee's conclusions. The committee's duty to demonstrate re-
177. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. Mathews v. Eldridge provides that in
evaluating whether due process requires a given procedure, the "administrative burdens
that the additional ... procedural requirement would entail" is one factor that a court
must consider. 424 U.S. 319, 334-35, 347-48 (1976) (citation omitted). Although pro-
viding notice, an opportunity for the patient to participate, and a written determination
may somewhat inconvenience ethics committees, such burdens seem a small price to pay
given the fact that, for all practical purposes, the committee's action may conclusively
determine the outcome of a disputed treatment decision. Indeed, other commentators
have maintained that committees ought to provide even more procedural protections,
regardless of how administratively burdensome those may be. See, e.g., Annas, supra note
76, at 56-57 (arguing that when committees review treatment decisions for incompetent
patients, the people involved must know the substantive and procedural rules, there
must be provision for representation of the incompetent patient, and there must be a
mechanism for appeal); Robertson, supra note 72, at 93 (asserting that if a committee
exerts decisionmaking authority, "the patient has the right to notice and participation
... and committee "operations should ... be open and available to public scrutiny");
Lo, supra note 10, at 47-48 (suggesting that an ethics committee inform patients of its
work, give patients or surrogates notice before discussing a case, issue patients or surro-
gates invitations to participate in the committee deliberations, and communicate the
committee's recommendations and reasons to all parties).
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spect for persons requires no less. Finally, its obligation to promote
the well-being of patients and avert harm to them mandates efforts
to protect their rights and interests.
In addition to legal and ethical obligations, the transformative
obligation of committees-their duty to assist in the recognition of
patients' rights and empowerment of patients-offers particularly
strong support for this set of procedural obligations. Indeed, any-
thing less than a concerted effort to support the voice, participation,
and authority of patients would violate this obligation. If commit-
tees are sincerely trying to transform health care relations and make
patients' power and authority a reality, then the committee should
see itself as accountable to the patient. After all, the legal and ethi-
cal consensus is that the patient has ultimate authority over whether
to accept or reject medical treatment. Unless overruled by a court,
it is the patient or her surrogate who has the right to say yes or no.
More ethics committees should see themselves as trying to satisfy
the patient that their procedures are open, fair, and thorough, and
their conclusions sound. Commentators have argued that good eth-
ics committee procedures can persuade higher authorities outside
the health care institution to listen to the committee.17 8 These com-
mentators would have committees play to the wrong audience. The
key person to persuade is the patient herself.
That yields the final element of my due process proposal: that
ethics committees undertake an obligation to evaluate their own
functioning and procedures periodically, 17 ' and perform the evalua-
tion first and foremost from the patient's point of view.'8 0 The com-
mittee must examine whether it is fulfilling its obligations to
patients. The key people to ask, though not the only ones, are pa-
tients themselves. The committee must ascertain whether all of
178. See, e.g., Cranford, Hester & Ashley, supra note 10, at 53 ("[Clourts may give
greater weight to [committee] recommendations where the committee process is open."
(footnote omitted)); Lo, supra note 10, at 47.
179. A literature has developed on the desirability of evaluating ethics committee per-
formance, but there is no consensus on the criteria by which their performance should
be judged. See, e.g., Allen, Moldow & Cranford, Evaluating Ethics Committees, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 23; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, DECIDING TO FOREGO
LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 4, at 170; Povar, Evaluating Ethics Committees:
What Do We Mean by Success?, 50 MD. L. REV. 904 (1991).
180. Cf. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324 (1987) ("[Tlhose who have experienced discrimination speak
with a special voice to which we should listen. Looking to the bottom-adopting the
perspective of those who have seen and felt the falsity of the liberal promise-can assist




these procedural protections in fact make full patient participation
possible. The best way to find out is to ask patients who have been
through the process.'"" Problems and obstacles that patients iden-
tify should cause the committee to consider further procedural in-
novation, beyond what I have proposed as a starting point.
C. Nesting Rights in a Community of Caring
One might conclude that despite the procedural innovations I
recommend, we should nonetheless give up on ethics committees.
After all, if Katz is right and there is an inevitable conflict between
the perspectives of doctors and patients,182 then maybe asking phy-
sician-dominated committees to look out for patients' interests is
like asking the proverbial fox to guard the chicken coop. Moreover,
if the committee exists within a health care institution and is com-
posed of members of that institution's staff, then the committee will
never provide the independent judgment of a body such as a court.
Ethics committees will indeed never provide the independence
of a court. Nor will committees ever be adequate guardians for pa-
tients' legal rights. That is why I have argued that use of an ethics
committee should never preclude judicial review, and that courts
should review litigated cases de novo, without deferring to a commit-
tee's prior determination. But all of that simply means that the com-
mittee's role must and should be different from the court's. The
court's role is to be the ultimate arbiter of legal rights; that role
requires independence from all parties. The committee's role, how-
ever, should be to help transform the decisional process at the insti-
tutional level into one that is ethically adequate and provides
protection for patients' rights.
It is precisely by operating within rather than outside of the in-
stitution, that a committee can reform in-house practice. Resort to
the committee becomes a part of the practice within the institution.
If the ethics committee through the mechanism of due process is
giving patients a voice and protecting patients' rights, then those
patients need not force the decisional process outside of the institu-
tion into a court of law in order to be heard. They can be heard
while the decisionmaking process is still occurring within the institu-
181. Youngner and his colleagues have reported an empirical study in which they
asked patients questions about ethics committees and received fascinating responses,
though the researchers did not focus on patients who had been through the ethics com-
mittee process themselves. See Youngner, Coulton, Juknialis & Jackson, supra note 10, at
22-23.
182. SeeJ. KArz, supra note 46, at 104-29.
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tion, close to the bedside, without the delay, formality, and expense
of judicial proceedings.
Thus ethics committees can perform a unique function, one the
courts do not share. That function requires that ethics committees
be part of the process for resolving disputes and handling treatment
decisions within the institution. When the committee is part of the
institution, then committee innovations to give patients voice and
rights in the committee's processes necessarily alter institutional
processes at the same time.
Moreover, by being part of the institution, the committee has a
particularly strong vantage point from which to discover and ad-
dress problems in practice within the institution but outside of the
committee. The committee is in a position to go through the often
slow and laborious process of changing the culture and practice
around it. The committee may also have considerably more credi-
bility and clout in certain quarters-say, among physicians-than
outsiders would.
The hitch, of course, is that a committee comprised of physi-
cians and other health care professionals from within the institution
may be less likely to advocate change and to advance the process of
according patients rights. As noted above, we may be asking the fox
to guard the chicken coop. But the hard reality is that in medical
relationships the fox must guard the chicken coop. The patient will
always be the more vulnerable and in need. It is up to the treating
clinician both to protect the patient's medical welfare and to create a
caregiving relationship in which the patient can exercise decisional
authority and assert her rights. There are others who can play im-
portant supporting and correcting roles, including courts. But in
the final analysis, it is clinicians themselves who will exercise the
greatest influence over the shape of clinical relationships and
decisionmaking.
Consequently, it is precisely the task of the ethics committee to
make the patient's participation and patient's rights a reality within
the committee's own in-house, clinician-dominated process. By do-
ing that, the committee both ensures patient participation and rights
within its own piece of the broader institutional decisional process,
and models for other clinicians within the institution a process that
takes patients' rights and authority seriously. While other clinicians
in their one-to-one relationships with patients will obviously not
pursue the precise processes a full committee does, the committee
will at least be demonstrating one approach to ensuring that the pa-
tient's voice is heard.
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The committee's embrace of a broad concept of due process
grounded in law, ethics, and a transformative mission, thus becomes
a tool. It is a means to guarantee that the patient can participate, be
heard, and assert her rights in the caregiving context. Due process
literally brings the patient into the committee room and gives her a
voice in the proceedings. It makes rights a reality in the caregiving
context.
Committees, however, should do more than change their own
procedures and thereby indirectly try to influence change in deci-
sionmaking practices outside of the committee. Ethics committees
should aggressively champion a broad concept of due process in the
clinical setting. They should encourage all within the health care
institution routinely to ask the question: are we pursuing decision-
making processes that are fair and empowering to the patient?
Both in embracing due process within the committee and in be-
coming the institutional champion of due process more broadly, the
committee will be playing a new role. For too long the ethical prin-
ciples guiding medical relationships have been reduced to four: au-
tonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice.' 3 One might
think that the principle of justice incorporates a notion of due pro-
cess. Instead, medical ethicists usually discuss justice in the context
of allocation and rationing where the question is what distributive
justice commands, rather than in relation to procedural rights.' 84
That, of course, is not a mere oversight. It is a function of the his-
toric ambivalence toward ceding patients full rights discussed
above. Thus for the ethics committee to embrace and champion
due process, the committee may well have to overcome considerable
resistance, both within the committee itself and in the broader
health care institution. Due process may be seen as some kind of
unwelcome intruder from the world of law,' 85 rather like a foreign
183. See, e.g., T. BEAUCHAMP &J. CHILDRESS, supra note 140. The widely read HAND-
BOOK FOR HOSPITAL ETHICS COMMIT=EES counsels ethics committees that these are the
principles they "should be concerned with in their work." HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at
12.
184. See, e.g., HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 13 ("Justice has many aspects but in health
care the aspect of concern is usually distributive justice .. "). See also T. BEAUCHAMP &
J. CHILDRESS, supra note 140, at 256-306. Beauchamp and Childress discuss procedural
justice, but include it within their explanation of the principle of nonmaleficence. See id.
at 169-70, 177.
185. I deliberately refer to the antagonism many physicians, nurses, and others in
health care settings feel toward the law and lawyers. Anxiety about the law, and animos-
ity towards people and things connected with the law, are important and interesting
facts of life in health care settings. There is the beginning of a literature on this subject,
and on the ways in which clinicians' feelings, beliefs, and attitudes about the law and
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virus invading a previously healthy body. But the real root of resist-
ance is likely to be not so much the origin of the notion, but the fact
that it protects patients' rights. Many may see an ethics committee's
embrace of due process and insistence on procedural protections
for the patient in committee case consultations as too much atten-
tion to patients' rights, creating an adversarial relation between the
patient and health care professionals. It may be seen as the triumph
of patients over caregivers, rights over caring.
This is precisely why it is so important that ethics committees
embrace due process and make it a routine part of their concerns.
Ethics committees must reject the stark dichotomy of patients versus
caregivers, rights versus caring. They must be the ones within their
health care institutions working hardest to make patients' rights a
functioning reality within medicine. That should be the basic mis-
sion of ethics committees. Fulfilling that mission means creating a
robust respect for patients' rights, but doing it in a way that pre-
serves the patient's relationships to caregiving health professionals.
It means rejecting the dichotomy between caring and rights, and in-
stead nesting those rights within a community of caring.
Most of this part of the article has been devoted to sketching
what attention to rights would look like. That is because the history
of medicine is a history of attention to caregiving instead. The
struggle is to recognize patients' rights. But it is important to say
what preserving caregiving relationships would look like in an era of
attention to rights. Consider an ethics committee that is adopting
my proposal, according due process to those patients whose cases
come before the committee, and championing due process concerns
in the broader institution. How does that committee also act to pre-
serve caregiving relationships?
The committee must first recognize that disagreement and con-
flict between physicians or other caregivers and their patients does
not by itself signify or excuse the end of the caregiving relationship.
Consequently, when a dispute comes to the ethics committee or
simply erupts in the broader institution, everyone should acknowl-
lawyers affect their practices. See, e.g., Johnson, The Fear of Liability and the Use of Restraints
in Nursing Homes, 18 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 263 (1990); Kapp & Lo, Legal Perceptions
and Medical Decision Making, 64 MILBANK Q. 163 (Supp. 2) (1986).
The Education Development Center and The Hastings Center have addressed these
problems in developing a training program for clinicians on termination of treatment
issues. See generally DECISIONS NEAR THE END OF LIFE, MODULE 2: WORKING WITH THE
LAw (1989) (magazine). Two relevant articles produced for that training program are
Dubler, The Law: Myths and Realities, id. at 22, and an excerpt entitled The Role of Law, id.
at 17 (drawn from GUIDELINES, supra note 25).
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edge that the caregiving relationship is continuing. The profes-
sional is not relieved of her responsibility to maintain that
relationship. But for the caregiver to be in disagreement and in re-
lationship simultaneously, means to accept the fact that disagree-
ment between caregiver and patient is not a sign of failure. In fact,
it can be a sign that a truly adult collaboration is under way between
two people who have different priorities and vantage points. I have
written about this at greater length elsewhere.' 86 There the starting
point of my argument was Jay Katz's fundamental insight that con-
flict between doctors and patients is inevitable, because of the great
difference in their values and perspectives. 87 Katz has argued that
physicians have spent centuries avoiding conversation with their pa-
tients. This silence has suppressed the conflict, but it also means
that physicians have failed to share information, have made all the
decisions themselves, and have shut patients out of the decision-
making process. The result, Katz maintained, is that patients have
felt abandoned. 88
Thus the ethics committee has an important role to play in per-
suading all that a good caregiving relationship includes exploring
areas of disagreement and facing that disagreement squarely.
Sometimes facing disagreement will mean going to the ethics com-
mittee. The ethics committee should let it be known that once a
dispute is there, the committee will not keep the patient from the
room, silence her voice, and thwart her participation. Instead, the
committee will do all it can to enable the patient to participate fully
and articulate her perspective. The committee will even enable the
patient to discuss and challenge the committee's own conclusions.
In this way the committee refuses to collude in perpetuating the
long history of silence that Katz condemns. The committee ensures
that the patient is in the room, that the silence is broken, and that
full dialogue ensues. Due process protections thus become a vehi-
cle for creating an even fuller kind of caregiving relationship than
before. This is a caregiving relationship based on uninhibited dia-
logue. The patient is no longer shut out and abandoned, as Katz
depicts. Instead, the patient can participate fully; she is free to
disagree.
Due process thus need not be the enemy of caregiving. At
heart, due process is a way to make sure the patient can speak and
186. See Wolf, Conflict Between Doctor and Patient, supra note 92.
187. SeeJ. Kxrz, supra note 46, at 99-100.
188. See id. at 207-25.
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be heard. That means that due process is indeed a revolutionary
force. Ensuring that patients can speak and be heard breaks the
long tradition of silence that left physicians the only ones with au-
thority. Due process allows patients to enter into active partnership
with their caregivers. It makes patients' rights and authority a func-'
tioning reality.
CONCLUSION
Ethics committees have come of age. Many of these committees
have been striving for recognition and influence within their health
care institutions, and they have succeeded. Many proponents of
ethics committees have worked hard to gain influence for these
committees even beyond the institution, in courts of law. They too
have succeeded. The result of all this success is that ethics commit-
tees wield real power over the fate of real patients.
Yet committees have thus far avoided taking responsibility for
this power. Committees simultaneously seek power but offer assur-
ances that they are merely advisory. They may exert a decisive influ-
ence over patients' legal and moral rights, yet routinely offer no
protection for those rights. They claim to benefit patients while
serving health care professionals.
These seeming contradictions tell a story. It is a story that be-
gan long ago when Hippocrates instructed physicians to perform
their duties "concealing most things from the patient."' 8 9 Patients
have since lived with centuries of physician paternalism and silence.
This pattern might have continued undisturbed. Yet astonish-
ingly, it did not. After centuries and centuries, in our own lifetimes
the realization finally dawned that it is the patient's body, her fate,
her life and death that are at stake. Thus her own personal values
must govern treatment decisions. This was a founding insight of
modern biomedical ethics. Nor did the law lag behind. Both ethics
and law called for patients' rights.
We have been embroiled in tumult ever since. The revolution
in medical relationships remains incomplete and embattled. In the
clinic, ambivalence reigns.
Ethics committees were born of the movement for patients'
rights. But they have grown up in the clinic. Those who have al-
ways held sway in the clinic, health care professionals and pre-emi-
nently physicians, have controlled ethics committees too. Their
189. See id. at 4 (quoting 2 HippocRATEs, DECORUM 197 (W. Jones trans. 1967)).
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ambivalence about patients' rights has fundamentally shaped these
committees. Double messages and paradox abound.
Some will see the health care professionals as villains in this
story and call for their defeat. That is not my purpose. Mine is to
show both sides that form the coin, to hear both messages and the
sound they form together, to see that the Escher print is both fish
and fowl.
Ethics committees are destined to be the place where health
care professionals and patients meet. Two different and often con-
flicting sets of interests will always be in that room. The necessity to
protect the patient's rights will always sit right beside the desire to
preserve caregiving relationships.
Some in that room will choose to see only one part of the pic-
ture, regarding all as a matter of patients' rights or all as a matter of
professional caregiving. I advocate a fuller vision. Only then will
we appreciate what to do.
Ethics committees must recognize that because they wield sub-
stantial power over the patient's fate, they have obligations toward
that patient. They must pursue a process that is fair and fully pro-
tective of the patient's rights. In arriving at their conclusions, they
must be attentive to the priority that both law and ethics assign to
the patient's authority to make treatment decisions.
Yet that is not enough. The patient is entitled to more than
rights; she is entitled to sensitive caregiving. The committee must
honor her rights while supporting her caregiving relationships.
When people are ill, rights and caregiving cannot be enemies. Pa-
tients need both. Rights give patients decisional authority in the
context of options and support provided by caregivers. And
caregiving depends on dialogue with the patient and respect for her
right to decide.
By stepping into treatment disputes, ethics committees obligate
themselves to honor patients' rights, while nesting these rights in a
community of caring. To do this, ethics committees must embrace
due process. They must ensure that the patient's voice is heard, that
she can participate fully in treatment decisions, exercise her deci-
sional authority, and challenge those who oppose her. Due process
is the way to guarantee this. It ensures that both sides are in the
room, collaborating and, if need be, struggling-both patient and
caregiver.
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